

GREEKS AND PERSIANS IN THE FOURTH CENTURY B.C.*

A STUDY IN CULTURAL CONTACTS
BEFORE ALEXANDER

PART I

BY

CHESTER G. STARR

Bentley Professor of History University of Michigan

INTRODUCTION

Asia all, that by salt sea lies
In proud embattled cities, motley-wise
Of Hellene and Barbarian interwrought.
—Euripides, *Bacchae*

The phrase "Greeks and Persians" is a famous one, with many overtones. The oldest surviving historical work in Western civilization, written by Herodotus, described in loving detail the expansion of the great Persian empire and its assaults on the tiny, contentious states of divided Greece in the early fifth century B.C. The unexpected, almost miraculous victory of the Greeks gave rise also to Aeschylus' *Persae*; to

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Mrs. Silvia Hurter was extremely generous in permitting me to discuss the Nablus hoard and in providing, as so often in the past, magnificent photographs. The late Henri Seyrig sent me all his materials on the numismatic appearance of Nergal; G. K. Jenkins and Otto Mørkholm were also helpful on numismatic matters. Many other scholars gave advice on specific points by letter or in personal discussion; I could not have sailed so far from shore in unknown waters without their aid and encouragement.

This essay, particularly because it is an interpretive study, I would dedicate to the memory of my father Chester Gibbs Starr (1885-1973), a wise and thoughtful gentleman who much enjoyed life.

commemorative painting and sculpture at Athens; and to a host of trophies ¹).

Whenever modern attention is given to the conjunction of these two worlds, the subject is almost always the Persian wars down to 479. Thereafter histories of Greece turn to the great soar of Hellenic culture into its classical triumphs, and to the parallel rise of the Athenian empire and then its fall in the Peloponnesian war at the close of the fifth century. These themes are treated, as a rule, exclusively in Greek terms; the Persians drop far into a dim background ²).

The purpose of the present essay lies elsewhere, in an extensive range of historical and cultural developments which lurk almost unnoticed in the conventional meaning of the term "Greeks and Persians." To the Father of History East and West represented two opposed ways of life, which could be summed up politically as despotism and liberty; and the Greek victory has commonly been taken as a conclusive mark of the superiority of Hellenic civilization, the root of Western culture. Insofar as historians of Greece look beyond the confines of Attica or European Greece, they have tended to depict Ephesus, Miletus, and other states on the opposite coast of Asia Minor, once famous and important, as weakened and rendered insignificant by Persian misrule. Symbolically, the oracle of Didyma near Miletus was reputed to have remained silent through Persian days until the time of Alexander ³).

1) Evelyn B. Harrison, *American Journal of Archaeology*, LXXVI (1972), pp. 195-97; L. H. Jeffery, "The Battle of Oinoe in the Stoa Poikile," *Annual of the British School at Athens*, LX (1965), pp. 41-57. In an interesting study, *The Greek Accounts of Eastern History* (Cambridge, Mass., 1973), R. Drews emphasizes and perhaps exaggerates the effect of the Persian wars on the appearance of formal history.

2) See, as one example, Hermann Bengtson, ed., *The Greeks and the Persians from the Sixth to the Fourth Centuries* (New York, 1968). Despite drawing in chapters from experts on parts of the empire, Bengtson himself frankly gives up any attempt to look at Persia for itself (p. 4). Note also the difficulty which E. Will feels in any effort to discuss Persia in his recent *Le Monde grec et l'Orient*, I (Paris, 1972), pp. 9-10.

3) Callisthenes in Strabo 17.1.43 (C814). I am not as certain as is G. E. Bean, *Aegean Turkey* (3d impression; London, 1972), p. 234, that this evidence is either symbolic or reliable; in the great investigation of the rights of asylum at shrines under the emperor Tiberius Miletus advanced as proof of the recognition of Didyma authority from Darius (Tacitus, *Annals* 3.63).

True, many of these states had been liberated by the Athenian crusade launched in vengeance for the Persian attack; but by the end of the fifth century they had been sold again into slavery by Sparta, which needed Persian gold to build and man its fleets.

The hostile pictures which Xenophon and Isocrates, and less fully Plato and Aristotle, drew of the effeminate rule of the Persians in the fourth century will require careful analysis in later pages. Here it will suffice to suggest that their view has commonly been accepted by modern historians, who return to Persia only when Alexander blazed out of Macedon in his great trail of conquest. This march is commonly portrayed as bringing civilization to all the Near East; whenever contacts between Greece and Persia are described before Alexander the vivifying factor is always taken to be Hellenism.

Such patterns of interpretation are natural, facile, and misleading. Historians must keep in mind the perspective from which they tell their stories, that is, the geographical and spiritual spots at which they themselves are standing. In ancient history we are accustomed to look at events from the vantage point of Rome or Athens or, less often nowadays, Jerusalem, and sometimes forget that these developments might appear very differently if we shifted our location. Our histories are so deeply impressed by a Hellenic stamp that even careful scholars are not aware of the distortions which they introduce. For example, were the Persian wars of the early fifth century "the central episode of Persian history" from the Achaemenid side? ⁴⁾ Again, the Athenian admiral Conon who commanded the Persian fleet at the battle of Cnidus is repeatedly treated in modern accounts as winning an *Athenian* victory. The achievements of Greece were so great that they can too easily blind us; to stand in Susa or Persepolis, or even in the Persian satrapal centers of Dascylium and Sardis, may restore our clarity of vision.

4) So Drews, *Greek Accounts of Eastern History*, p. 106. We cannot, in truth, know what the Persians would have considered the most important event in their history; one might argue, on the basis of available evidence, that the civil war resulting in the accession of Darius was the single most influential development after the conquests of Cyrus.

My objective in this study is to consider afresh the relations between Greeks and Persians from a point of view which seeks to hold the two sides in more even balance. If one thus takes up the available evidence—and applies to it proper historical criteria—an unexpectedly complicated picture of political and cultural relations may appear; above all the Persians will turn out to be less passive than is usually suggested.

Especially in cultural contacts the most appropriate place to look is on the frontiers between the two worlds, rather than in Iranian and Greek homelands; but here difficulties arise at once, or more graphically and perhaps no less accurately one plunges into a spiny thicket of obscurities and uncertainties. Cyprus and Egypt, which might be termed part of this frontier, exhibited local peculiarities born in the one case of a tangled inheritance and in the other of the strong imprint of pharaonic ways; Egypt, moreover, was not under Persian rule during much of the fifth and fourth centuries.

These areas will enter our vista only when we consider political relations between Greeks and Persians; for cultural aspects I shall rely mainly on relevant examples from Asia Minor. Here the Achaemenid and Hellenic worlds met most directly, but here too the obscurities and uncertainties just noted confront us as modern observers.

Within the peninsula of Asia Minor distinctions must be made between the belt directly adjacent to the coasts, which was largely but not entirely Hellenized⁵⁾; then the regions immediately inland from the coastal strip (including major lines of communications especially); and finally the great bulk of the center and eastern parts of Anatolia. In some political aspects one can discuss Asia Minor only as a whole, but

5) This coastal strip is in a sense defined in the so-called peace of Callias of 449 B.C., one provision of which demilitarized the lands lying one day by horse (about 40 miles) in from the coasts; see H. Bengtson, *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums*, II (Munich, 1962), no. 152. As necessary I shall refer to districts such as Cappadocia or Lycia without seeking absolute geographical precision in their boundaries; for doleful comment on the problems involved in this respect see L. Zgusta, *Kleinasiatische Personennamen* (Československá Akademie Věd, Monografie Orientálního ústavu ČSAV 19, Prague, 1964), pp. 32 ff. Nor will it be necessary here to provide topographical descriptions, which would inevitably be lengthy and irrelevant as well to my major purposes.

in economic and cultural developments the most interesting area consists of the regions between the coast and the vast interior. These districts were the true meeting place of Iranian and Greek cultures, and at least some of the results can be seen across the last years of the fifth century and then the fourth century down to the invasion of Alexander in 334, the lower chronological limit of my discussion.

The evidence from Asia Minor is growing, but it is still inadequate for the purposes of writing a full history of the peninsula in the Persian period, even if we draw in Hellenistic and Roman parallels. Nonetheless sufficient literary and physical testimony exists to suggest how varied were the consequences of the interweaving of Greek and Achaemenid cultures, as drawn upon by the natives of the land. In general, moreover, these diverse lines of evidence will enable us to put our study of cultural interrelations in a fresh perspective; further information, which will undoubtedly turn up in subsequent years, should allow scholars to paint the lights and shadows more precisely.

The relations of Greeks and Persians in the fourth century present problems which are intriguing in themselves. Over and above the specific issues, however, a reflective student of human history will be led to meditate on very fundamental questions. What, thus, was the essential nature of Hellenism? Above all, what happened when it encountered another great culture?

Nowhere else in the whole course of ancient history can we watch the meeting of two major, independent ways of life. The results were not nearly as Greek-dominated as they are commonly pictured; Alexander's conquest interrupted, rather than consolidated, very important lines of development. One can, alas, only speculate as to how different the cultural progress of the eastern Mediterranean would have been without this interruption, but the interactions which had already taken place in fourth-century Asia Minor may at least suggest that peaceful fusion would have had significant results.

PART I ⁶⁾POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS

I. CHARACTER AND HISTORY OF THE PERSIAN EMPIRE

The Persian empire endured for more than two centuries, from the first conquests by Cyrus of Media in 550 and Asia Minor in 547 to the death of Darius III in 330. Its political history, however, can be treated as a continuous narrative only on the basis of Greek references, even though these are themselves haphazard as well as prejudiced in their outlook ⁷⁾. Persian inscriptions of a historical nature, like that of Darius on the cliff of Bisutun, are rare; others which this king set up at Chalcedon have not survived ⁸⁾. Whereas the Assyrian royal reliefs often have a significant historical content, the two great Apadana staircases at Persepolis are static, though magnificent, evocations of the rites of the New Year's feast. This decorative, timeless quality is characteristic of Achaemenid art (cf. Plate VIII.a); nowhere in Persepolis or in the royal tombs nearby at Naqsh-e Rostam is there any direct historical reference—until one's eyes sink from the tomb of Darius to the relief of the Sassanian king Shapur, triumphant over Roman emperors. No evidence exists to suggest that the Persians themselves wrote formal historical accounts; there are not even any direct references to Greek

6) The plates of this article will appear in Part II, which is to be published in *Iranica Antiqua* XII.

7) Thus A. T. Olmstead, *History of the Persian Empire* (Chicago, 1948), is a work written by a scholar at home primarily in the Near Eastern tradition but forced to cite mainly Greek sources. M. A. Dandamayev, "Politische und Wirtschaftliche Geschichte," in *Historia*, Einzelschrift 18 (1972), pp. 15-58, gives a general survey which draws on available Near Eastern materials. W. Hinz (*ibid.*, pp. 5-14) discusses the sources found since 1948.

8) Herodotus 4.87 (cf. 4.91); a building inscription of Darius, found in Rumania but probably from Thrace, is published by J. Harmatta, *Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungariae* II (1954), pp. 1-14. For other Persian material see R. G. Kent, *Old Persian Grammar Texts Lexicon* (2d ed.; American Oriental Society XXXIII, 1954).

relations in Persian documents available to us⁹). Only for scattered events such as the accession of Darius or the financial pressures on Persian nobles which are attested in the archives of the Murashu firm in Babylon do we have useful non-Hellenic sources¹⁰).

As far as Asia Minor is concerned, recent years have seen the publication of a great variety of detailed and popular treatments of pre-historic Anatolia and of the rediscovery of the Hittite realm. There are also valuable works on the periods of Hellenistic, Roman, and Byzantine rule on down to the retreat of Hellenism after the Turkish conquest. Yet since Walther Judeich published his *Kleinasiatische Studien* over eighty years ago no one has devoted serious attention to the history of Asia Minor in the era of Persian domination, whether political or economic or social; the two centuries of Persian rule have rolled away almost as if they never existed¹¹).

For the administrative structure of the Persian realm the situation is somewhat better, especially with regard to the central government.

9) The latter point is made by Manfred Mayrhofer, *Xerxes König der Könige* (Vienna: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Festvortrag, 1970), p. 166, who goes on to discuss the character of Xerxes as reflected in Persian inscriptions, the Book of Esther, and Herodotus. As he observes, the one point at which Herodotus' account can be paralleled in Persian material is the accession of Xerxes (Herodotus 7.2-3; XPF in Kent).

I am, incidentally, not convinced by the occasional argument that Herodotus drew on Persian formal accounts. P. A. Brunt, "Persian Accounts of Alexander's Campaign," *Classical Quarterly*, n. s. XII (1962), pp. 141-55, argues for their existence on a later occasion.

10) On the latter topic see the Ph. D. dissertation by Matthew Stolper, "Management and Politics in Later Achaemenid Babylonia: New Texts from The Murašû Archive," U. Michigan 1974.

11) W. Judeich, *Kleinasiatische Studien: Untersuchungen zur griechisch-persischen Geschichte des IV. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.* (Marburg, 1892), a series of detailed essays essentially on political/military events; the detailed chronology on pp. 309-45 cannot be accepted in all particulars. The disinterest in the subject on the part of modern scholars will be noted below repeatedly; but let me give here two examples: first, the markedly Hellenic bias of A. H. M. Jones, *The Cities of the Eastern Roman Provinces* (2d ed.; Oxford, 1971), shown in his introduction on p. xiii; secondly, the recent thorough study of *The Troad: An Archaeological and Topographical Study* (Oxford, 1973), by J. M. Cook, which has essentially one comment on the influence of Persian rule in almost four hundred pages of text. These examples are certainly typical, not exceptional.


In the prime of the empire administrative archives were extensive; and enough has come to light in recent decades to allow detailed discussion of Achaemenid organization. From Persepolis there are records of payments in food and silver to official travelers, including satraps and ambassadors, and to workers on the palaces and other buildings; further tablets have been found at Susa; Greek authors, moreover, indicate that the kings and their advisers could draw on a variety of reports and letters in assessing political or diplomatic issues¹²). Herodotus provides a lively account of the royal postal system on the road from Susa to Ephesus; the excavations at Dascylium turned up a deposit of some 300 *bullae* or clay sealings which had been attached to letters or orders, and mostly bore devices of Xerxes (Plate I.b)¹³).

On the *bullae* 30 seal impressions had Old Persian in cuneiform, 10 were Aramaic, and only 1 was Greek. For the empire as a whole, however, Old Persian seals are not very common, and all the evidence suggests that the kings used first Elamite and then more and more commonly Aramaic scribes for internal administration; but the system was flexible enough to employ Greek or other tongues in appropriate places¹⁴). The satraps of Asia Minor struck coinage very largely with Aramaic inscriptions; yet Greek could appear alongside Aramaic on

12) George G. Cameron, *Persepolis Treasury Tablets* (Oriental Institute Publications 65, Chicago, 1948); R. T. Hallock, *Persepolis Fortification Tablets* (Oriental Institute Publications 92, Chicago, 1969); Hallock has digested the information on administration in his chapter in *Cambridge History of Iran*, II (separately published at Cambridge, 1971). See also my *Political Intelligence in Classical Greece* (Mnemosyne, Supplement 31, 1973), c. 5.

13) Kemal Balkan, "Inscribed Bullae from Daskyleion-Ergili," *Anatolia*, IV (1959), pp. 123-28, who makes the obvious but probably unwarranted assumption that the documents themselves concerned Xerxes' invasion of Greece. A. D. H. Bivar in *W. B. Henning Memorial Volume* (London, 1970), pp. 52-53, notes that none of the sealings can be exactly paralleled in the Persepolis evidence and suggests the style "might be taken as later, or provincial."

14) On Old Persian seals cf. Cameron, *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, XXXII (1973), p. 52. One Greek and one Phrygian tablet were found at Persepolis (Hallock, PF 1771, J. Friedrich, *Kadmos*, IV [1965], pp. 154-56); note that the Phrygian tablet, presumably written in Asia Minor, nonetheless had the month in the Old Persian calendar (Cameron, pp. 52-53). This may reflect Persian administrative practice, though the Greek tablet uses the common Semitic calendar.



Map 1. Persian Empire at its Height.

these issues, and Greek mints themselves employed Greek even for coinage directed by their Persian masters. From the days of the Persian wars Greeks and Persians learned the language of the other side; but men like Herodotus or Tissaphernes had to command the services of polyglot intermediaries ¹⁵).

The Greeks, on whom we must in the end rely to form a connected picture, looked at events in the Persian empire from their own geographical point of view, which rarely extended farther afield than developments in Egypt. We cannot, accordingly, place ourselves in the seats of a royal council at Susa and survey all the frontiers of the vast empire. This unfortunate limitation must always be kept in mind; for Persian actions and reactions in the west may often have been conditioned, or restricted, by concerns on the borders of inner Asia, where nomad tribes moved to and fro ¹⁶). Still, our primary interest at this point is in sketching the political relations between Greeks and Persians, especially in Asia Minor, to serve mainly as a backdrop for contemporary economic, social, and cultural developments. Important aspects of these relations can be seen at least in their general dimensions; here I shall concentrate on three topics: Greek views of the Persians in the fourth century; the political history of the period, particularly but not exclusively in its connection to Asia Minor proper; and finally the bearing of this history on Greco-Persian cultural connections.

The Greek View of the Persians

It might well be more interesting to know the Persian view of the Greeks, but this is a subject on which we can scarcely speculate. Did the Persians, indeed, even have enough interest in the Greeks to form

¹⁵) Herodotus 9.16.2 cites a Persian who spoke Greek; Themistocles spent a year learning Persian (Plutarch, *Themistocles* 29.3). On Tissaphernes, see Thucydides 8.45, 8.56, 8.85; Xenophon, *Anabasis* 2.3.17.

¹⁶) For a brief survey of these borders see B. G. Gafurov, "Les Relations entre l'Asie centrale et l'Iran sous les Achéménides." *La Persia e il mondo greco-romano* (Rome: Accademia nazionale dei Lincei, Problemi attuali di scienza et di cultura Quaderno no. 76, 1966), pp. 199-212 (in Russian, pp. 183-97). As he and others have observed, settled conditions and the use of writing expanded along the eastern frontiers in Achaemenid times.

a stereotype? Herodotus notes Cyrus' scornful dismissal of the Greeks as men who chattered and deceived each other in markets and later describes Greek warfare, as seen by Mardonius, as a simple push of pike on even ground. These specific statements, especially the former, might be genuine Persian comments, but we cannot give any weight to the more general praises and criticisms of the Hellenes which appear in the Herodotean speeches assigned to Artabanus and Mardonius. Again, when Cyrus the Younger delivered the eulogy of Greek freedom to his Greek mercenaries which appears at the beginning of Xenophon's *Anabasis*, this was at best an appropriate statement for his special audience¹⁷).

Clearly the Persians were willing to make use of the skills and enjoy the delights of Greek men and women, from concubines and dancing masters to military tacticians and mercenaries. Kings and satraps alike listened to the advice of fugitive Greek leaders such as Demaratus of Sparta and Themistocles of Athens. They also knew quite enough of internal Greek conditions to be able to play one *polis* against another and to make cunning use of Persian gold in bribery; examples of this corruption of Greek politicians occur from the Persian wars on down through the fourth century¹⁸). The dispatch of ambassadors to Philip as he was rising in Macedonia shows that the Persian administration kept a careful eye on Greek developments¹⁹). In the magnificent setting of the Persian royal court, to which most Greeks came either as slaves or as obsequious diplomats or adventurers, it was very possibly the Hellenes who were considered barbarians—but sufficiently dangerous to be kept split and under watch²⁰).

17) Herodotus 1.153, 7.9; Xenophon, *Anabasis* 1.7.3.

18) Herodotus 9.2, 9.5, 9.41 are the earliest instances.

19) Plutarch, *Alexander* 5.1.

20) Herodotus 7.136 (Spartan refusal to do proskynesis) is definitely the exception; cf. the subterfuge of Ismenias in Plutarch, *Artaxerxes* 22.4. On Greek embassies see generally J. Hofstetter, *Historia*, Einzelschrift 18 (1972), pp. 94-107; D. J. Mosley, *Envoys and Diplomacy in Ancient Greece* (*Historia*, Einzelschrift 22, 1973), p. 40, with its citations of Tod, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, II, no. 138; and Bengtson, *Staatsverträge*, II, no. 183. According to G. Walser, "Griechen am Hofe des Grosskönigs," *Festgabe Hans von Greyerz* (Bern, 1967), pp. 189-202, A. Wiedersich listed some 300

The Greeks, on the other hand, certainly considered the Persians, as all other non-Greek peoples, as "barbarians" (*barbarophonos*, a term already used in Homer's *Iliad*). From the fifth century onwards the term *barbaros* bore conscious connotations of cultural inferiority as well. In recent studies this evolution has been carefully explored in fifth-century literature, including the drama, and also in artistic depictions of non-Greeks, both Persians and others ²¹). There has been less consideration, however, of the conventional picture of the Persians which dominates most fourth-century writing. This view needs careful and cautious inspection; it pervades most modern accounts of the era almost without analysis.

The number of Greek authors who discussed in one way or another the Persians is extensive ²²); on historical grounds we must concentrate on those who had some opportunity of knowing Persia at first hand. Ctesias, for one, had been a doctor at the Persian royal court and wrote a *Persica* in 23 books, detailing Eastern history from Ninus and Semiramis down to 397 B.C.; this work has been described as "the standard authority on Persian history from Xerxes through the early years of

Greeks between Cyrus and Alexander who lived at the Persian court or came as emissaries (Diss. Breslau, 1922, unpublished); more than 100 of these were military personnel.

21) Cf. Helen Bacon, *Barbarians in Greek Tragedy* (New Haven, 1961); H. C. Baldry, *The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought* (Cambridge, 1965), pp. 22-24; Julius Jüthner, *Hellenen und Barbaren* (Leipzig, 1923); Helmut Schoppa, *Die Darstellung der Perser in der griechischen Kunst bis zum Beginn des Hellenismus* (Coburg, 1933), with Anne Bovon, "La Représentation des guerriers perses et la notion du barbare dans la 1^{re} moitié du V^e siècle," *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique*, LXXXVII (1963), pp. 579-602; Hans Schwabl et al., *Entretiens Hardt VIII: Grecs et Barbares* (Geneva, 1961), esp. pp. 39 ff. (H. Diller); Chester G. Starr, *Awakening of the Greek Historical Spirit* (New York, 1968), pp. 49-56. It is intriguing to note that almost no one who discusses the concept of *barbaros* goes on to observe that the Greek term was clearly a loanword from Akkadian (H. Frisk, *Griechisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch* [Heidelberg, 1960], s.v.).

22) A sufficient list may be found in Raffaele Cantarella, "La Persia nella letteratura greca," *La Persia e il mondo greco-romano*, pp. 489-504. Drews, *Greek Accounts of Eastern History*, discusses the earlier writers (genuine or fictitious) with respect to their accounts down through the Persian wars.

Artaxerxes II" ²³). A second major author, Xenophon, accompanied the expedition of Cyrus the Younger to wrest the throne from his brother Artaxerxes, first as a gentleman volunteer and then after the Persians entrapped the Greek mercenary generals as one of the elected generals of the 10,000. In addition to his account of their retreat to the Black Sea in the *Anabasis*, Xenophon also continued the history of Thucydides in his *Hellenica* down to 362 and composed a semi-fictional account of the life of Cyrus, the founder of the Persian empire (the *Cyropaedia*). One recent survey of the Greek view of the Persians in the fourth century goes so far as to label him "révélatrice de l'évolution intérieure de l'Empire Perse" ²⁴).

Only scraps of Ctesias' work survive, and their character may reflect the interests of the excerptors; still, it is clear that the doctor did dwell with loving horror on the intrigues of the Persian courts, where eunuchs played major roles and the wives and mothers of the kings could inflict the cruelest of deaths upon their enemies. Xenophon had no opportunity to see this level of Persian life, though his works illustrate ruthless vengeance among lesser Persians. A companion Persian fault in Xenophon's portrayal is *apistia* or faithlessness. This was exhibited especially by the wily, unscrupulous Tissaphernes; his rival, the satrap Pharnabazus, is once depicted as asserting that *he* did not engage in such double-dealing ²⁵).

Equally evident in Xenophon's picture is the lavishness of Persian life and a resultant lack of manliness. Once the Spartan king Agesilaus

23) Cameron, *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, XXXII (1973), p. 55, properly warns that excerptors and summarizers may have distorted the general nature of Ctesias' account; but the contemptuous criticisms by F. Jacoby *s.v.* Ktesias in Pauly-Wissowa and by Drew, *Greek Accounts of Eastern History*, pp. 103-16 (whence the quotation in the text), cannot thus be entirely gainsayed. The fragments are in *FGrH* III C 688; cf. generally Diodorus 2.3.24, 14.46. F. W. König provides translation and discussion of the material in his Beiheft on Ctesias, *Archiv für Orientforschung* (1972).

24) Cl. Mossé, "Les Rapports entre le Grèce et la Perse au IV^{ème} siècle avant Jesus-Christ," *La Persia e il mondo greco-romano*, pp. 177-82 (as italicized by author, on p. 179). This essay is a clear, terse exposition of the conventional view of Persia as wealthy and feeble.

25) Xenophon, *Hellenica* 4.1.32-3; for Tissaphernes see *Anabasis* 3.2.4, *Hellenica* 3.4.

sold his Persian captives naked in order to show his own troops how white-skinned and soft these barbarians were; later in the *Hellenica* an ambassador from Elis reported back that the King had many cooks, "but as for men who could fight with Greeks, he said that though he sought diligently he could not see any" ²⁶). The Greeks, however, had bodies better able to bear cold, heat, and toil; by the blessing of the gods they had better souls; and above all they were free men reared in the *eleutheria* of the *polis* ²⁷). For all the Persians were slaves of the king, even Cyrus the Younger as against his brother, and had to be driven by the lash in battle ²⁸). Readers of Xenophon's works, such as Isocrates, gained a picture of the Persian military system which was misleading then, and has distorted judgments ever since. On proper ground, true, the Greek heavily armed infantryman, the hoplite, was invincible in his phalanx; but Persian strength lay rather in unmatched cavalry, financial resources, and sea power ²⁹).

Oddly enough, Xenophon does not seem to have felt any need to justify an entirely different portrayal of Cyrus in the *Cyropaedia* as a model figure, though in the last books of this work he appears to argue that in the time of Cyrus the Persian ruler was not a ruthless despot, but a benevolent, good example. The concluding chapter of the study, however, is very different in tone and sums up all the flaws noted above, as being characteristic of the Persians in the writer's own day. This chapter may well be a spurious addition, but if so it suggests how widespread the conventional picture of the Persians had come to be at Athens ³⁰).

At one point in the *Anabasis* Xenophon drew a significant conclusion, in his own speech to the troops after the Persian seizure of the mercenary generals, that "we must first try to reach Hellas and our own people,

26) Xenophon, *Hellenica* 3.4.19, 7.1.38.

27) Xenophon, *Anabasis* 3.1.23, 3.2.13.

28) Xenophon, *Anabasis* 1.9.29, 3.4.26.

29) Cf. N. G. L. Hammond, *A History of Greece to 322 B.C.* (Oxford, 1959), p. 451.

30) From Dindorf on this chapter (8.8) has usually been considered spurious; O. Reverdin doubts it again recently, *Entretiens Hardt*, VIII, pp. 96-97.

and show the Hellenes that they are poor only because they want to be, when they could bring their paupers over here and see them rich”³¹). Either by following out this idea or by his own meditation the Athenian publicist Isocrates developed a project that the Greeks should unite, and in merging their own strengths could easily take the riches of Asia for their own. This scheme Isocrates first advanced seriously in his *Panegyric* of 380, addressed to the Spartans and Athenians; but many years later he still followed the theme in urging Philip of Macedon to serve as a disinterested leader of the Greeks in a crusade against the Persians. Repeatedly in his extensive literary product over a long career Isocrates made the Persians his principal *bête noire* and fulminated, for example, at the fact that the King’s Peace of 387, dictated by the Persians to the warring Greek states, had been set up on the Acropolis itself³²). The Persians for Isocrates exhibited cowardice, lack of faith, and slavery before their rulers; they were “effeminate and unversed in war and utterly degenerate from luxurious living”³³).

Some of the same themes appear more briefly in other major writers of the century. In his last work, the *Laws*, Plato had his Athenian spokesman discuss briefly the decline of freedom in Persia from the days of Cyrus, especially at the hands of the vengeful women and eunuchs in Cambyses’ court and again under Xerxes and his successors; in conclusion the Athenian summed up, “Enough of the Persians, and their present maladministration of their government, which is owing to the excess of slavery and despotism among them”³⁴). In more limited references Aristotle cited the slavery even of sons to fathers in Persian life and suggested that some of the repressive devices of tyranny may have had Persian roots³⁵). From Theopompus one fragment

31) Xenophon, *Anabasis* 3.2.26.

32) Isocrates, *Panegyric* 180, *Panathenaicus* 107. Isocrates himself notes that war against the Persians was a common theme in the oratory of his day (*Panegyric* 3, 15).

33) Isocrates, *Panegyric* 120, 150-52; *Philip* 124.

34) Plato, *Laws* 3.694 ff.; cf. *Republic* 5.469b-471c (barbarians and Greeks as natural enemies); *Menexenus* 239 ff.

35) Aristotle, *Politics* 5.1310 ff.; *Nicomachean Ethics* 8.10.4 (1160b.29 f.).

survives which satirically stressed the luxury of the Persian king during an invasion of Egypt ³⁶).

To follow out in detail the conventional fourth-century view of the Persians as weak, enslaved, yet rich, is scarcely necessary; for it lies in the background of almost all modern histories of Greece. Yet, as one recent author who accepts the picture casually observes, the conventional Greek attitude made it impossible for the Greeks to have “a real understanding of the individual character of the Persian race and of the Achaemenid Empire” ³⁷). Before we share that acceptance, we need to consider both the origins and the plausibility of the conventional interpretation of fourth-century Persia.

In this picture there were true ingredients. Modern visitors to Iran, such as Robert Byron, have expressed their shock at the obviously non-Western political autocracy and social stratification of the land; one who penetrates a mud-brick village where the residents stand aloof and indifferent must sense a different structure of life than that which produces the vigorous curiosity and warm interest shown by Greek villagers. Even if we discount the technological upheavals of recent decades an ancient Greek may well have shared somewhat the same response of stunned annoyance as he approached a Persian capital after traveling over great expanses held by traditional peasants.

The wealth of the kings, heirs to all the Near East, needs no discussion; Alexander found huge sums of gold and silver in the storehouses of “the great king, king of kings, king of the countries possessing many kinds of people, king of this great earth far and wide.” The imputation that “slavery and despotism” automatically led to maladministration and weakness, on the other hand, must be examined critically; nor, as we shall see later, is there any reason to follow Xenophon, Herodotus, and other Greeks in portraying the founder Cyrus and the organizer Darius as markedly more efficient than the Persian kings of the fourth century.

At least on the surface the Persian system was indeed despotic. In

³⁶) Theopompus T42 F263 (from *On the Sublime* 43).

³⁷) Bengtson, *Greeks and Persians*, pp. 3-4.

sculptured reliefs such as the audience scene of the Treasury at Persepolis (Plate VIII. a), the monarch looms out, sharply distinguished by his square beard cut off at the waist and dressed in tiara with upright points, purple robe, and crimson trousers³⁸). He sits on a high throne with a stool to protect his feet from contact with the ground; often a parasol shades his head and a fly-flapper guards his sacred majesty. One part of Achaemenid court ritual, the famous proskynesis, was badly misinterpreted or even misrepresented by the Greeks to suggest total subjection before this despot and has given rise to modern theories about a sacral kingship among the Persians³⁹).

Fortunately we have some evidence emanating from the Persian kings themselves about the theory and principles of their government. In boastful inscriptions, including the famous Bisutun trilingual proclamation by Darius, the monarchs underlined not solely their absolutism but also stressed their justice and their belief that they held their powers by divine grant. In Egypt the Persian king succeeded the pharaohs and was a god on earth; Babylonian Marduk, according to Cyrus, had sought a righteous prince and found his choice in Cyrus; among the Persians themselves Darius proclaimed that "by the grace of Ahura Mazda Darius is the king"⁴⁰).

His son Xerxes repeated nearly in the same words the noble proclamation which Darius had inscribed at Naqsh-i-Rustam:

38) Professor Cameron informed me that he measured the figure of Darius at Bisutun at 6 feet, the guards behind him at 5 feet 2 inches, and the captured kings just 4 feet (King and Thompson give 5'8", 4'10", and 3'10").

39) E. J. Bickerman, "A propos d'un passage de Chares de Mytilene," *La Parola del Passato*, XVIII (Naples, 1963), pp. 241-55; and more recently R. N. Frye, "Gestures of Deference to Royalty to Ancient Iran," *Iranica Antiqua*, IX (1972), pp. 102-07. The rite consisted essentially of kissing one's right hand before the ruler; the Greeks, true, reserved this salutation to reverence before the gods. But as Bickerman observes, already in Aeschylus, *Persians* 588 (and Isocrates, *Panegyric* 151), there appears the concept that Persians fell prostrate before their master.

40) Erich F. Schmidt, *Persepolis*. I (Chicago, 1953), pp. 65 (gate inscription), 63 (terrace inscription). H. W. Ritter, *Diadem und Herrschaft* (Munich, 1965), pp. 6-30, discusses one aspect of the king's attire, with references to the "upright tiara" or *kidaris*; normally the Persian monarch even crowned himself (p. 27). On another aspect see Meyer Reinhold, *History of Purple as a Status Symbol in Antiquity* (Brussels, 1970), pp. 18-20.

A great God is Ahuramazda, who created this marvel which is seen, who created happiness for man, who bestowed wisdom and activity upon Xerxes the king.

Says Xerxes the king: By the favor of Ahuramazda and Artā I am of such a sort that I am a friend to right, I am not a friend to wrong. It is not my desire that the weak should have wrong done to him by the mighty, nor is that my desire, that the mighty should have wrong done to him by the weak. What is right, that is my desire, I am not a friend to the man who is a Lie-follower.

I am not hot-tempered. (When the anger become to me,) I hold firmly under control by my will. I am firmly ruling over myself.

The man who cooperates, according to his cooperation thus I protect, who does harm, according to his damage thus I punish. It is not my desire that a man should do harm, nor is that my desire if he should do harm, he should not be punished.

What a man says against a man, that does not convince me, until I hear the solemn testimony of both.

What a man does or performs, according to his natural powers, I am satisfied and my pleasure is abundant and I am pleased and I give abundantly to devoted (watchful) men.

This is my understanding and my judgement. When what has been done to me, you shall see or hear, whether in my court or in my army, then you [will believe] of my activity, [which is] above thinking power and understanding.

This is indeed my activity: In as much as my body has the strength, as battle-fighter I am a good battle-fighter. Once with the power of my intelligence, placed in the battle field, I can distinguish the enemy from the no-enemy. Then superior from panic, I can decide, both with my intelligence and my judgement, whether I see the enemy or I see the no-enemy.

Trained I am both with hands and with feet. As a horseman, I am a good horseman. As a bowman, I am a good bowman both afoot and on horseback. As a spearman, I am a good spearman, both afoot and on horseback.

These are the skills that Ahuramazda has bestowed upon me and I have the strength to use them. By the favor of Ahuramazda what has been done by me, I have done with these skills which Ahuramazda bestowed upon me. Ahuramazda protect me and what has been done by me ⁴¹).

The tone is magniloquent, but the aims and virtues of Persian government which are here suggested deserve to be kept in mind alongside the very different views suggested by the Greeks.

In judging the efficiency of this system a modern student might well draw a comparison with the Turkish structure of early modern times, for the sultan was described by European visitors in much the same terms as the Achaemenid kings as the one master in his realm—"the rest are slaves without individual or aggregate dignity" ⁴²). So too the intrigues at the Achaemenid court might be, and sometimes have been, compared to those at Istanbul. We know, however, that the Sublime Porte had the most advanced bureaucracy of Europe down into the seventeenth century and also that its power by land and sea as well as in diplomacy was not swiftly broken. It is not so easy to correct the Greek view of the Persians, but a considerable revision must nonetheless be attempted.

Those modern scholars who trustingly accept the picture drawn by Xenophon, Isocrates, and others thus fail to note that it was not at all original with the fourth century. On the contrary all the themes stressed by Xenophon had already appeared in the history of Herodotus. The Father of History was accused of philobarbarism and was capable of

41) B. Gharib, "A Newly Found Old Persian Inscription," *Iranica Antiqua*, VIII (1968), pp. 54-69, to be compared with Darius DNB, which is more extensive; see also Walther Hinz, *Altiranische Funde und Forschungen* (Berlin, 1969), pp. 45-51; and Mayrhofer, *Xerxes König der Könige*, pp. 158 ff. The inscription was turned up in 1967 by a tractor near Persepolis (George Cameron has suggested a few corrections in the translation, which are incorporated above).

42) Lord Broughton (1809-10) as quoted by George Rudé, *Europe in the Eighteenth Century* (London, 1972), p. 87. Rudé also quotes an earlier observation by Lady Mary Wortley Montagu on the factual weakness of the sultan; "the government here is entirely in the hands of the army."

admiring many aspects of Persian customs; yet he did conceive the Greeks as better than the Persians and stressed the meaning of the invasion of Xerxes as a conflict of despotism and freedom. At Thermopylae the Persian forces had to be driven by the lash, and the concluding chapters of Herodotus' history contain a tale of court savagery which is not outdone by anything in Ctesias.

Even more significant, but rarely considered, are the speeches which Aristagoras of Miletus purportedly delivered to the Spartans and Athenians, urging them to support that Ionian revolt which eventually led to the Persian invasions of Greece. Three themes are stressed in the first speech, to Cleomenes of Sparta: the Ionians are enslaved; the barbarians are not good fighters, since they use bows and short spears and are clad in breeches and turbans (rather than hoplite armor); Asia is richer than all the rest of the world in gold, silver, bronze, embroidered clothes, animals and slaves—"by wishing for it you will have it". According to Herodotus Aristagoras presented the same arguments to the Athenians "about the good things in Asia and the manner of Persian warfare"⁴³).

When did this picture originate? The contrast between Persian enslavement to monarchs as against the liberty of the *polis* may well be an old theme, for it occurs in essence in a couplet of Phocylides in the mid-sixth century:

The law-abiding town, though small and set on a lofty rock, outranks senseless Nineveh⁴⁴).

Following the Persian conquest of Ionia the antithesis of freedom and slavery very possibly was intensified; in Aeschylus' *Persians*, performed eight years after Salamis, the theme is clearly stressed.

Likewise the contrast between Greek poverty and Asiatic wealth

43) Herodotus 5.49, 5.97. In an extended discussion of Aristagoras (*Rivista di filologia*, LIX [1931], pp. 48-72), G. de Sanctis paid minimum attention to these speeches.

44) Phocylides in Dio Chrysostom, *Oration* 36.13; cf. Xenophanes fr. 3 (Diehl). G. P. Carratelli, "Le guerre mediche et il sorgere della solidarietà ellenica," *La Persia e il mondo greco-romano*, pp. 147-56, also cites Heraclitus fr. 107.

can be traced back at least as far as Archilochus' disdain for the treasures of the Lydian Gyges. It was in truth no more than a genuine reflection of Hellenic amazement at the old centers of Near Eastern civilization and kingship; in the fifth century the theme recurs often, as in the epigram on Marathon where the Athenians "prostrated the force of the Medes bearing gold" and often in the pages of Herodotus ⁴⁵).

But one element in the picture seems much younger, Aristagoras' emphasis on the military incapacity of the Persians. This idea could scarcely have existed in the sixth century when Greeks lived in that fear of the Medes which is reflected in Theognis and Xenophanes; we can hardly imagine that it was well developed even in the days of Aristagoras, at a time when Persian arms still seemed invincible. Herodotus himself stresses the importance of Marathon as showing the Greeks that they could defeat Persian armies: "up to then it aroused fear among the Greeks even to hear the name of the Medes" ⁴⁶).

The manner in which Persian methods of combat are itemized in the speeches of Aristagoras suggests knowledge of the results of Marathon and Plataea; one might postulate that the combination of the themes of Persian ineffectiveness in battle and luxurious wealth was a compensatory release after the war with Xerxes, designed at once to explain and also to magnify that victory. In its roots it may be a transfer from the explanation advanced for the failure of Ionia to keep or recover its freedom; but as applied to the Persians the combination must be a mid-fifth century product. Certainly it spread swiftly; the Hippocratic treatise *On Airs Waters Places* ascribes the unmilitary character of the Asiatics to a combination of climate and laws ⁴⁷). By the time Phere-

45) Archilochus fr. 15 (Lasserre-Bonnard), purportedly spoken by a carpenter (Γύγεω τοῦ πολυχρύσου); F. Hiller von Gaertringen, *Historische Griechische Epigramme* (Bonn, 1926), no. 12, χρυσοφόρων Μήδων; cf. Democritus fr. 251, who argues that poverty within a democracy is better than wealth under dynasts, just as freedom is better than slavery. In Herodotus see especially 7.102. Drews, *Greek Accounts of Eastern History*, p. 5, does not perhaps choose the proper word in speaking of Greek "admiration" of their eastern neighbors.

46) Herodotus 6.112.3; Xenophanes fr. 18 (Diehl); Theognis 764, 775-76.

47) *On Airs Waters Places* 12, 16, 23; Baldry, *Unity of Mankind*, pp. 22-23, emphasizes the role of the Persian wars in giving the antithesis of Hellene and barbarian

crates produced his play, the *Persians*, perhaps in 425, comedians could dilate lovingly on the wealth of foods the Athenians would gain if they conquered the Persian empire⁴⁸).

This picture of weakness and wealth conjoined has a serious logical incoherence, but irrationality has never prevented the evolution and persistence of hostile ethnotypes. Far from "revealing" truths about the Persian empire of the fourth century Xenophon, I would suggest, brought his prejudices as part of his baggage when he accompanied the expedition of the 10,000; and careful examination of his work must lead to the conclusion that he does not significantly advance our knowledge of the real nature of the Persians in the fourth century. What *is* suggestive both in Xenophon's references and still more in the frenetic fulminations of Isocrates is quite a different matter. If both authors display a deeply felt hostility and emphasize Persian inherent flaws, a skeptical historian may suspect that they did so not solely because they were thinking in general shibboleths but rather because Persia was really a power with which to be reckoned in Aegean politics in their time.

In the following section I shall essay to demonstrate that this actually was the situation, but there is one more voice of the fourth century to be heard, if only briefly. Demosthenes had occasion in several speeches to refer to the Persians, above all to their diplomatic reactions, real or possible, to actions which he was proposing. There is not in these speeches any hint that Demosthenes considered the Persians ineffective. In his speech *On the Navy Boards* he observes that the requisites for war are first fleets, money and strong points, "and I find that the King is more fully supplied with these than we are." The great orator of Athens did not like the King and animadverted on the Persian ability to split apart the Greeks by money and offers of friendship; he found it very difficult to assess what Persian policy might turn out to be at any juncture; but very clearly it was important for a Greek political leader

"its emotional force." On the explanation of the Ionian failure see C. A. Roebuck, *Ionian Trade and Colonization* (New York, 1959), pp. 1-2.

48) Pherecrates fr. 130 (= Athenaeus 6.269C).

to take that factor seriously into account ⁴⁹). In considering the political developments of the fourth century a modern historian will do better to utilize Demosthenes as a guide to the realities of the situation rather than to repeat the jejune aspersions of Xenophon and Isocrates, drawn ultimately from a view which for us first appears in Herodotus.

Political History of the Fourth Century (to Alexander)

Any effort to write a meaningful political history of the Persian empire, solely in its western provinces and only as seen by the Greeks, must end when Herodotus lays down his pen; in his narrow concentration Thucydides omits far too much even for the later fifth century ⁵⁰). The situation with respect to the fourth century is no better. A fairly good continuation of Thucydides by an unknown historian survives only in some papyrus chapters (*Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*). Another effort, the *Hellenica* of Xenophon, we do have almost intact, but Xenophon was not gifted with great intellectual powers, and his history becomes the poorer the farther it progresses. Xenophon thus omits almost entirely the story of Evagoras of Salamis, for which a modern historian must rely on the incomplete picture in the later writer Diodorus, who used the work of another fourth-century scholar, Ephorus. Plutarch composed an essay on Artaxerxes II, but this brief "life" draws heavily from Xenophon and Ctesias, and shoals off rapidly for the king's later years ⁵¹). For reference the Persian rulers in the fourth century may be listed here:

Artaxerxes II	404-359
Artaxerxes III	359-338
Arses	338-336
Darius III	336-330

49) Demosthenes, *On the Navy Boards* 9, 31; *For the Rhodians* 12-13.

50) A. Andrewes, "Thucydides and the Persians," *Historia*, X (1961), pp. 1-18, discusses Thucydides' failure to treat the Persians in the 420's and earlier part of the next decade.

51) Plutarch and others also used the histories of Persia by Dinon of Colophon (*FGrH* 690) and Heracleides of Cyme (*FGrH* 589).

In this situation it will be more useful to forego the spinning of hypotheses so as to create a continuous story, and instead try to set forth in order the main series of problems which the Persian administration faced on its western flank. The course of events connected with each issue cannot always be described, but the results are in most cases reasonably clear. Only thereafter can we hope to assess the general bearing of Persian political history ⁵²).

First came a resolution of the uncertain structure which Persia faced in Ionia and the Aegean. This intricate matter may well have seemed the most pressing; diplomatically it presented opportunities as well as dangers, and economically the Persian government wished to regain its ancestral tribute from the cities of Asia Minor. By the bargain between the Spartans and Tissaphernes in 412, renewed in subsequent years, the Spartans agreed to allow the Persians complete control of the seaboard of Asia Minor, which the Athenian crusade of the mid-fifth century had "liberated". In return the Persians promised in 411 to provide the Spartans the funds with which to build and man the fleets which gave them final victory in the Peloponnesian war (404) ⁵³). By this date, however, the younger brother of the king, Cyrus the Younger, had been sent down to Asia Minor as over-all viceroy (*karanos*); before the death of his father in 404 Cyrus had returned briefly to the court and then came back to Sardis to plan a revolt. In order to gather support for his effort Cyrus permitted the Greek cities virtual freedom. The Spartans also gave naval and land aid to his expedition, partly perhaps because they had some moral regrets at turning Greeks over to the power of the King; after all they had fought the Peloponnesian war to eliminate the slavery (*douleia*) implicit in the Athenian empire ⁵⁴).

52) For some significant events I shall note major sources; details are given in works of Beloch, Bengtson, Judeich, Kienitz, or Olmstead (see Bibliography).

53) Bengtson, *Staatsverträge*, II, nos. 200-202. Thucydides 8.5-6 emphasizes the King's directives to Tissaphernes and to Pharnabazus to regain the tribute of the Greek cities.

54) Against the reserves of G. E. M. de Ste Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (London, 1972), p. 36, cf. the speech of Brasidas (Thucydides 4.85).

Following the death of Cyrus at the battle of Cunaxa (401) the Spartans certainly tried to default on their earlier bargain, relying on their naval command of the Aegean, their tested military prowess, and the Greek cities of Asia Minor. They sent over an expeditionary force under king Agesilaus in 396, who waged desultory war with the satrap Pharnabazus in northern Asia Minor and with Tissaphernes in the south; despite Xenophon's partiality Agesilaus may be summed up as a fair tactician but a leader without much strategic sense ⁵⁵).

The Persians, on the other hand, saw very clearly what needed to be done. Tissaphernes was appointed *karanos* in Asia Minor to secure unified command down to 395, then replaced briefly by Tithraustes, and then by Pharnabazus (both in 395) ⁵⁶). Persian emissaries, loaded with gold, went from Pharnabazus to Greece to play on the resentment of Corinth, Thebes, and other states against the arrogant hegemony of Sparta. The result was the outbreak of what is termed the Corinthian war (395), which forced the Spartan government to recall Agesilaus from Asia Minor.

The Persians also began to enlarge their navy in Cyprus and Phoenicia, and for this purpose gladly hired ex-Athenian sailors and even the major Athenian admiral Conon in 398. Like every other power which has constructed a navy, the Persians found the process very expensive; after some funds had been released the Persian treasury grew more reluctant. Diodorus recounts that Conon went to Babylon and convinced Artaxerxes that he could destroy Spartan military power, if given full support; the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* disagrees as to an actual meeting between king and admiral, but proper aid was nonetheless forthcoming. Beyond the costs of constructing and rigging the Persians had to meet for a fleet of 100 triremes a payroll of some 800 talents a year ⁵⁷). This fleet, under the joint command of Conon and Pharna-

55) Cf. Judeich's harsh judgment, p. 9. These campaigns are often discussed, as by Judeich, c. 2; and Ch. Dugas, "La campagne d'Agésilas en Asie Mineure," *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique*, XXXIV (1910), pp. 58-95.

56) Beloch, III.2, p. 135 gives the position of *karanos* to Tiribazus, as being the satrap at Sardis; but the role of Pharnabazus at this time appears the major one.

57) Diodorus 14.39, 79, 81 ff.; *Hell. Ox.* 14-15; Justin 6.2.12-13.

bazus, met the Spartans in 394 off Cnidus and smashed Lacedaemonian naval power forever. The news was brought to Agesilaus as he faced a major land battle in Boeotia, but the king hid the information until he had won his own contest at Coronea.

The career of Conon provides an excellent example of the Hellenic bias of modern scholarship. To give only one example out of many the Spartan control of part of Asia Minor is said to have been "ended for good by the Athenian naval victory under Conon"; the same writer observes later, "The Athenian admiral Conon, with the Persians now on his side, put an end to Spartan control" ⁵⁸). In reality Conon was serving as a *Persian* admiral just as much as John Paul Jones was a Russian admiral under Catherine the Great or Thomas Cochrane a Chilean, Peruvian, and then Brazilian admiral in the early nineteenth century ⁵⁹). Demosthenes saw matters more clearly when he told the Athenian assembly that "Conon, serving as general for the king, without prompting from you, defeated the Spartans on the sea" ⁶⁰). After the victory of Cnidus, indeed, Conon used his strength to give the Athenians a few crumbs, or so he was charged by Tiribazus, *karanos* of Asia Minor in 393 ⁶¹); but the power which mainly profited by his activity was Persia. That naval command of the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean which the Persians had held down to Salamis and Mycale (479) was now restored to Persian hands, and was never again

⁵⁸) George E. Bean, *Turkey beyond the Maeander* (London, 1971), pp. 71, 139. S. Perlman, "Athenian Democracy and the Revival of Imperialistic Expansion at the Beginning of the Fourth Century B.C.," *Classical Philology*, LXIII (1968), pp. 257-67, gives the same view; R. Seager, "Thrasybulus, Conon and Athenian Imperialism, 396-386 B.C.," *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, LXXXVII (1967), pp. 95-115, is more judicious (cf. pp. 99-101).

⁵⁹) S. E. Morison, *John Paul Jones* (Boston, 1959); the latest life of Cochrane is by Warren Tute (London, 1965), and his activities in Greece are discussed by William St. Clair, *That Greece Might Still Be Free* (London, 1972), pp. 303 ff.

⁶⁰) Demosthenes, *Against Leptines* 68; cf. Plato, *Menexenus* 244-245, or for that matter Isocrates, *Panegyric* 154 and *Panathenaicus* 105, which are clear enough if read without prejudice.

⁶¹) Diodorus 14.85.4; the Long Walls were rebuilt with the aid of Persian subventions at this time.

even questioned by Athens or any other Greek state until the conquests of Alexander ⁶²).

In Greece itself Persian policy fluctuated against or for Sparta, depending in part on the varying assessments of Greek conditions by the over-all commanders in Asia Minor. Tiribazus lost his power to Autophradates in 392; and Struthas, who was pro-Athenian, was appointed satrap of a temporary satrapy of Ionia. In 388 Tiribazus came back into power, perhaps because the Persian central administration had decided to back the Spartans once and for all. In the next year the ambassadors of the major Greek states assembled at Sardis and accepted from Tiribazus the King's edict to end the wars:

King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia should belong to him, as well as Clazomenae and Cyprus among the islands, and that the other Greek cities, both small and great, should be left independent, except Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros; and these should belong, as of old, to the Athenians. But whichever of the two parties does not accept the peace, upon them I will make war, in company with those who desire this arrangement, both by land and by sea, with ships and with money ⁶³).

As one careful scholar sums it up, "the following decades of Greek history are an unrelieved display of Persian domination," a truth which is often obscured in modern surveys of the incessant wars on the Greek mainland ⁶⁴). But all powers, Thebes as well as Sparta, sought Persian endorsement or acquiescence; and in building up its Second Confederacy Athens was very careful never to infringe openly on Persian naval or land power in Asia Minor ⁶⁵). Repeatedly the Athenians skirted the edge of trouble by lending a general to an opponent of the Persian

62) Note the Athenian caution in Demosthenes, *For the Rhodians* 9.

63) Bengtson, *Staatsverträge*, II, no. 242 (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 5.1.31; Diodorus 14.110.3).

64) Bengtson, *Greeks and Persians*, p. 213. Dandamayev, *Historia*, Einzelschrift 18, p. 18, gives quite a different picture which I cannot accept.

65) Note for example the care in the phrasing of the alliance between Athens and Chios in 384 (Tod, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, II, no. 118).

king or by providing other aid, but as we shall see the king had only to give a direct order and Athens would draw back hastily. On at least one occasion the Athenians appear to have sought financial assistance from a Persian satrap ⁶⁶).

Other items on the Persian calendar of western issues must be dealt with more briefly, for they lay farther from the Aegean and were less likely to be discussed in detail by Greek sources. One minor, but troublesome, affair was the "insolence" of Evagoras, king of Salamis on Cyprus, who was eulogized by Isocrates in the first surviving semi-biographical essay in Greek literature ⁶⁷). Initially Evagoras gave considerable assistance to the preparation of the Persian fleet which smashed Spartan sea power. This was a serious error if he really planned from the outset to create an independent position for himself ⁶⁸); and certainly thereafter he sought to make himself master of all Cyprus and even to extend his power into southern Asia Minor and Phoenicia, districts which were commercially interconnected. In this ambition he was encouraged by Hecatomnus, dynast in Caria, and by the independent rulers of Egypt, Acoris and Nectanebo; it appears that he also had some secretive Athenian support. Diodorus and Isocrates suggest that he had a 10-year run in his endeavors, but this decade can only provisionally be set as 390-80.

Local magnificence and pomp the Persians were willing to tolerate, but refusal to pay tribute was a different matter ⁶⁹). After settling the King's Peace Artaxerxes II appears to have concentrated first on an

66) *IG II/III²*, no. 207 = Bengtson, *Staatsverträge*, II, no. 324 (usually taken as an alliance with Orontas; but see M. J. Osborne, *Annual of the British School at Athens*, LXI [1971], pp. 297-321).

67) The tangled web around Evagoras is discussed by Judeich, pp. 113-36; Beloch, III.2, pp. 226-29; I am much indebted to the paper by my student Eugene A. Costa, Jr., "Evagoras I and the Persians, ca. 411 to 391 B.C.," *Historia*, XXIII (1974), pp. 40-56. The chronology depends partly on the dating of Isocrates, *Panegyric*, which is put by Judeich in 381 (pp. 137-43) and by Beloch and most recent scholars in 380.

68) As argued by Gjerstad. *The Swedish Cyprus Expedition*, IV.2 (Stockholm, 1948), pp. 488-502, but Costa convincingly refutes this view.

69) Ctesias 62.

abortive effort against Egypt ⁷⁰), but then he directed his attack against Evagoras "because he appreciated the strategic position of Cyprus and its great naval strength whereby it would be able to protect Asia in front" ⁷¹). Eventually Persian forces threw Evagoras out of Tyre and other mainland points, and an expedition under the joint command of Tiribazus and Orontas invaded Cyprus. Dissensions between the commanders led to the imprisonment of Tiribazus, but after a trial he was freed and Orontas temporarily disgraced ⁷²). Evagoras was forced back into Salamis and given terms of accepting rule solely of his native state, paying tribute, and obeying Persian orders "as slave to *despotes*." On the latter item Evagoras balked, and after some further hostilities secured agreement that he should be treated as "king to king" ⁷³). Nonetheless his wings were clipped for good.

Once again the Persians turned their eyes on Egypt, and very extensive preparations were made for a major attack, based on south-east Asia Minor. Under Persian pressure the Athenians withdrew their general Chabrias from service under Nectanebo ⁷⁴), and another Athenian general Iphicrates was sent to assist the Persian forces. Evidently large numbers of Greek mercenaries were also hired, for the coinage of Pharnabazus at this time was tremendous in volume and largely Greek in types; these and subsequent issues by his successor Datames must be considered in detail in later pages (see Plates XV-XVI). The attack came in 373 but bogged down in the canals and floods of the Nile ⁷⁵).

70) According to Isocrates, *Panegyric* 140, Abrocomas, Tithraustes, and Pharnabazus were in command of this effort, to which he assigns three years (385-383); cf. Judeich, pp. 153-57; Beloch, III.1, pp. 96-97; Kienitz, p. 85.

71) Diodorus 14.98.3.

72) Diodorus 15.8.3.

73) Diodorus 15.8.2-3.

74) Diodorus 15.29.3-4; Nepos, *Chabrias* 3.1; on Greco-Egyptian relations see also the chronological analysis by P. Cloché, "La Grèce et l'Égypte de 405 à 342/1 avant J.-C.," *Revue égyptologique*, n.s. I (1919), pp. 210-58; J. G. Milne, "Trade between Greece and Egypt before Alexander the Great," *Journal of Egyptian Archaeology*, XXV (1939), pp. 177-83; F. Zucker, "Athen und Aegypten bis auf den Beginn der hellenistischen Zeit," *Aus Antike und Orient* (Festschrift Schubart; Leipzig, 1950), pp. 146-65, is concerned primarily with Athenian knowledge of Egypt.

75) Diodorus 15.29, 41-43; Beloch, III.1, pp. 211-12; Judeich, pp. 160-63; Kienitz, pp. 89-92.

Nor can we say much more about ill-described revolts of satraps in Asia Minor ⁷⁶). The first rebellion, led by Ariobarzanes of Dascylium and Datames of Cappadocia along with Mausolus of Caria, may have had some effect in hampering continuation of the attack on Egypt, but this outbreak seems to have been broken by the intervention of the king himself and was quelled by 359/8 (death of Datames). A second revolt is ascribed to Artabazus, satrap of Phrygia, and Orontas of Ionia, who coined heavily (Plate XIII.m); but this outbreak too was somehow quelled. Orontas even kept his position, but Artabazus fled to Macedon ⁷⁷). During the first revolt Athens ventured to take power in Samos, but in the second it withdrew its general Chares, who had served Artabazus, on the king's orders ⁷⁸). In the end Persian power was firmly reestablished in Asia Minor.

Thereafter Artaxerxes III Ochus was finally ready to marshal the forces of his empire against Egypt ⁷⁹). Though conquered swiftly by Cambyses in 525, Egypt was geographically so isolated and culturally so different from the rest of the Near East that it was held only sporadically by the Persians. From the last years of the fifth century onwards it was independent ⁸⁰). Yet Egypt throughout this period had connections with the Aegean, partly for commercial reasons; politically its independent pharaohs aided in turn Sparta, Evagoras, the rebel satraps, and finally revolts in Syria and Palestine by the gifts of grain and money.

The Persians reconquered Syria and Phoenicia by 345-43 ⁸¹), then in 343 carried out their final reconquest of Egypt (apart from a transitory

76) Judeich, pp. 190-220; Beloch, III.1, pp. 212-16, III.2, pp. 254-57. The only useful chronological evidence is in Trogus 10 (Prologue).

77) Demosthenes, *On the Navy Boards* 31; Beloch, III.2, pp. 138-40, 148-49.

78) Diodorus 16.22.2, 34.1; Judeich, p. 211.

79) Beloch, III.2, pp. 284-87; Judeich, pp. 144 ff.

80) Egyptian independence has generally been dated to 404, but Elephantine papyri show that Artaxerxes II was still recognized as king in Upper Egypt at least to the end of 402; cf. Edda Bresciani in Bengtson, *Greeks and Persians*, p. 341. On Egypt generally cf. Kienitz, c. 7.

81) Diodorus 16.41 ff. Apparently this revolt was connected with the failure of a Persian attack on Egypt about 351 (Bengtson, pp. 406-07; Judeich, pp. 170-76; Kienitz, pp. 100-01).

rebellion in 338-36)⁸²). In Asia Minor the Rhodian general Mentor was placed in command in 345 and reduced sundry local despots such as Hermias of Atarneus, the patron and father-in-law of Aristotle. Earlier the local Lycian princes had been eliminated in the time of Mausolus, and the native Syennesis of Cilicia had lost his throne at the beginning of the fourth century, probably when this area became an important marshalling point for Persian expeditionary forces. The success of the Persian kings in restoring their power and reducing local centers of authority may paradoxically have made the conquest by Alexander much easier⁸³). Without going into this event in detail, however, I would observe that the Macedonian victory cannot be taken as a final proof of the utter weakness of the Persian state; Alexander had to fight three major battles before triumphing—whereas many Near Eastern empires over the course of its history have collapsed after only one defeat.

The Significance of Fourth-Century History

When described in compressed form, Persian activities in the west from 410 to 340 must appear a tangled web of dim, faceless personalities and ill-connected events. The evidence is almost wholly Greek; worse yet we lack Persian sources which might suggest more clearly the rationale of diplomatic and military policies, and the bearing of developments on other frontiers than that of the west.

That Persian plans were executed in an apparently confused and dilatory fashion is not surprising; Xenophon was more than usually acute in observing that “if the king’s empire was strong in its extent of territory and the number of inhabitants, that strength is compensated by an inherent weakness, dependent upon the length of roads and the inevitable dispersion of defensive forces.” Edicts issued by the king in

82) On Khababasha cf. Kienitz, pp. 185-89.

83) Jason of Thessaly commented in Xenophon, *Hellenica* 6.1.12, “The king of the Persians is the richest of mortals; and yet I think it is even easier to reduce him to subjection than to reduce Greece. For . . . everyone there, save one person, has trained himself to servitude rather than to prowess.”

Susa had to be carried down the Royal Road to Asia Minor, a distance of three months for an ordinary traveler and certainly a matter of a week and more even for the Persian post under the best of conditions ⁸⁴).

Policies which were connected to Aegean politics, moreover, had to be implemented by two major satraps, those of Dascylium and Sardis; and these were proud grandees of ancient lineage not always inclined to cooperate ⁸⁵). The difficulties which could arise are suggested in the Greek accounts of Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes, the twin satraps of the late fifth and early fourth centuries, who appeared to the Greeks to have independent policies and indeed could be played against each other ⁸⁶). Only on occasion did the king appoint an over-all *karanos* in Asia Minor to ensure the concentrated application of Persian strength.

Yet, to give a modern parallel, how would a later age evaluate the British empire in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Africa and India if it had only scraps of evidence, and those from the opposing side? The local diplomatic and naval agents of British policy did not

84) Xenophon, *Anabasis* 1.5.9. The unpredictability of ancient travel is far too often ignored; cf. the cautions of F. Braudel, *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II* (2d ed., Paris, 1966), I, pp. 327-28. On Persian improvements see S. Mazzarino, "Le vie di comunicazione fra Impero achemenide e mondo greco," *La Persia e il mondo greco-Romano*, pp. 75-83.

85) The satrapal organization of Asia Minor varied over the decades; beyond those named above there were usually a satrapy of Cappadocia and in the fourth century satrapies of Greater Phrygia and Caria. Ionia was at times separated from Lydia. See Beloch, III.2, pp. 131-56 (with a list of the known satraps on pp. 155-56). Cameron, *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, XXXII (1973), pp. 47 ff., proves that the lists in Darius' inscriptions are of peoples, not of satrapies per se, a point to keep in mind in considering P. J. Junge, "Satrapie und Natio. Reichsverwaltung und Reichspolitik im Staate Dareios I," *Klio*, XVI (1941), pp. 1-55; cf. his posthumously published study, *Dareios I, König der Perser* (Leipzig, 1944). On satrapal chancelleries see Dandamayev, *Historia*, Einzelschrift 18, p. 24. The depiction of "peoples" on the newly discovered statue of Darius contains Sardis, Cappadocia, Skudra (Thrace?); see *Journal asiatique*, CCLX (1972), p. 258, and compare G. Walser, *Die Völker-schaften auf den Reliefs von Persepolis* (Berlin, 1966).

86) Xenophon, *Hellenica* 3.1.9. Pharnabazus was grandson of a satrap of the same name, who may have descended from Darius' collaborator Artabazus (cf. Th. Lenschau s.v. Pharnabazus in PW); Tissaphernes might have sprung from the family of another collaborator, Hydarnes (H. Schaefer s.v. Tissaphernes in PW, Suppl. VII).

always agree and acted largely on their own, at least in outward appearance; but we happen to know that the general lines of policy were set or altered in Westminster⁸⁷). So too the frontier wars in Afghanistan or southern Africa were long drawn-out; empires do not marshal their forces easily, and have too many commitments to be able to concentrate for long in any one area.

Certainly Greek diplomats and generals were aware where the decisive point in Persian policy lay, and sought always to reach beyond local governors to the Great King himself⁸⁸). Persian field commanders also knew how far their independence of action stretched; Cyrus the Younger is said at one juncture to have had the king's orders and could not act beyond them⁸⁹). Satraps revolted in the fourth century, but so too had others earlier. Simply because we happen to know more about Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus we cannot conclude that they were more self-willed than earlier satraps had been, nor does the presence of their names on coinage prove that they held a more independent position than had those who never coined. Tissaphernes himself was executed in 395 for serious disobedience and failure to achieve the king's plans⁹⁰).

Indeed the writ of the Persian king was unquestioned in Greece, at least after Cnidus. Its potency was always restored whenever challenged in some part of the Near East. The conventional picture in modern accounts of a state in serious decline and riven by dissension may correspond to that sketched by Xenophon and Isocrates but it does not accord with historical reality.

This conclusion does not entail a judgment that the Persian ad-

87) Cf. Jasper Ridley, *Lord Palmerston* (London, 1970), pp. 153-54, on the local freedom of Palmerston's diplomats within the context of "a full statement of the aims of British foreign policy in connexion with the country to which they were accredited," and the specific example of the actions of Lord Auckland in Afghanistan during 1838-1842 (pp. 335-37); cf. Sir C. Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston 1830-41* (London, 1951), II, pp. 744-52.

88) E.g., Xenophon, *Hellenica* 1.3.13.

89) Xenophon, *Hellenica* 1.5.3.

90) Xenophon, *Hellenica* 3.4.25; Diodorus 14.80.6-7; *Hell. Ox.*, cols. 6-7. The hostility of the queen mother Parysatis was a factor in this case; but Tiribazus, after a long career, was also executed in 362 (Plutarch, *Artaxerxes* 27, 29).

ministration always operated efficiently. The picture of Artaxerxes II which is drawn by Plutarch (after Ctesias), is of a sluggish monarch beset by intrigues of eunuchs and harem. In such a system, however, eunuchs provide almost the only alternative for a ruler who does not wish to rely too heavily on hereditary nobles of his court ⁹¹); and harem intrigues are an inevitable concomitant of ancient—and modern—Near Eastern palace structures. Yet the frequent shifts in the over-all command of Asia Minor especially during the 390's do suggest a fluctuating uncertain line of policy as laid down by the central governmental organs.

Another characteristic especially of Persian military activity was the almost standard policy of appointing two joint commanders for any major expedition. When the two were Conon and Pharnabazus, there appears to have been cooperation; but in the instance of the Persian invasion of Cyprus under Tiribazus and Orontas, and on other occasions which have not been cited, firm action was frequently impeded by the quarreling of the commanders. Single unified command, however, is a device not easily attained even in the twentieth century, and a suspicious monarch might well accept the possibility of slow, indecisive prosecution of an operation as small insurance against revolt of a field commander; to judge from scattered references Persian nobles were almost as capable of the traitor's role as were discontented Greek leaders ⁹²). The various Persian efforts which have been sketched in preceding pages moved with a deliberation which offends modern critics—but in the end Persian forces won every time.

In varying but often important degree these operations were based on the resources of Asia Minor. Pharnabazus, Datames, and later Mazaeus struck very extensive silver coinage in Cilicia (Plates XV-XVI); food and fodder were undoubtedly required on the major lines of Anatolian communications to support the movement of troops, as in

91) M. K. Hopkins, "Eunuchs in Politics in the Later Roman Empire," *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society*, 189 (1963), pp. 62-80.

92) E.g., Herodotus 6.3, 6.4.1; Spithridates (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 3.4.10, *Hell. Ox.* XVI.4 = col. 20); Glos (Diodorus 15.9.4); Tamos (Diodorus 14.35); Zopyrus (Ctesias 43; Herodotus 3.160).

the march of the 10,000 inland; men and animals were very probably drafted in numbers. The fact that the Persian machinery of government and of war-making was in the end successful even in putting down revolts of satraps in Asia Minor suggests that it must have commanded support from significant elements in the peninsula. These constituents can be identified as the Greek cities and the rural magnates.

Initially, according to Xenophon, the Greek cities desired to be free and also feared Tissaphernes. As far as we can now judge Tissaphernes from his portrayal in Thucydides, who drew on Alcibiades' own acquaintance with the satrap, and also in Xenophon, who had some contact with him after the battle of Cunaxa, this fear seems to have been properly justified; a recent work calls Tissaphernes "a mystery" ⁹³). In 395 he was executed because of his lack of success against Agesilaus, and the next *karanos*, Tithraustes, proclaimed the king's orders that the cities should be "autonomous" and pay only their ancient tribute ⁹⁴). This position was accepted by the Spartans in 392, and the Greeks of Asia Minor themselves seem to have been satisfied ⁹⁵).

To argue *ex silentio* is always dangerous, but up to this point no evidence has appeared to suggest that these Greeks supported any of the satrapal revolts or other anti-Persian activity in the following decades, or themselves revolted as several states had done against Athenian domination in the fifth century. Rather, the Greek cities thrived on a scale unmatched at least in the preceding century; to this development I shall return in the next chapter.

Greek states under Persian rule did not call out to their brothers

93) H. D. Westlake, *Individuals in Thucydides* (Cambridge, 1968), p. 4 n. 1; Xenophon, *Hellenica* 3.1.3.

94) Xenophon, *Hellenica* 3.2.12, 3.4.25, 4.8.14. The significance of the latter aspect, i.e., payment of ancestral tribute, in directing Persian policy from the late fifth century onward is noted above in no. 53.

95) Beloch, III.1, pp. 95-96, takes the *symmachia* coinage of Rhodes, Cnidus, and other states as reflecting an alliance after the King's Peace to secure their liberty; but this coinage is now generally dated to the era of the battle of Cnidus. Cf. J. M. Cook, *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, LXXXI (1961), pp. 56-72; G. L. Cawkwell, *ibid.*, LXXXIII (1963), pp. 152-54.

across the waters for liberation from despotism ⁹⁶). Greek generals such as Agesilaus, Conon, Timotheus, Chares, Chabrias, and others operated in Asia Minor and farther afield; but whether employed by Egypt, by rebel satraps, or by the Persian king himself they were primarily motivated by financial reasons, secondarily by the policies of their home states, and not at all, as far as one can determine, by any concept of liberation ⁹⁷). When Alexander crossed into Asia, some but by no means all of the Greek states favored his cause, especially after he proclaimed an end to tribute; but it must be doubted whether their freedom under Alexander meant more internal powers of self-government than had the "autonomy" which the Persians had conceded ⁹⁸).

Another element which must have been important in the continuance of Persian rule was formed by the local dynasts and rural magnates of the areas inland from the Greek cities. Significant economic and social developments were taking place by the fourth century among these leaders and will also be considered in the next chapter; seals and reliefs, which will be discussed in Chapter 4, provide interesting evidence on their cultural position, which may be summed up at this point as primarily Iranian. The political stance of rural lords, however, does not often appear in the literary record, save in such cases as the surreptitious support which Hecatomnus of Caria gave for a time to Evagoras; but even in the magnificent reign of Mausolus his subjects at Mylasa dated their decrees by the years of the Persian kings ⁹⁹). Some-

96) As against Isocrates' portrayal of poverty and uncertainty in Asia Minor (*Philip* 100, 120 f.) cf. the survey in my next chapter.

97) E.g., Ariobarzanes rewarded Agesilaus with money and Timotheus with the possession of Sestos and Kriothote in 364 (Nepos, *Timotheus* 1.3; [Xenophon], *Agesilaus* 2.26-27; Judeich, pp. 201-03).

98) E. Badian, "Alexander the Great and the Greeks of Asia," *Ancient Society and Institutions* (Oxford, 1966), pp. 37-69; note the garrisons of Alexander at Chios (Tod, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, II, no. 192) and Aspendus (Arrian, *Anabasis* 1.26-27).

99) Tod, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, II, no. 138. The first of these decrees, indeed, deals with the execution of a Carian envoy to the Persian king, who plotted against Mausolus and was condemned by the king, not Mausolus.

times the landlords may have aided unruly satraps, but on the whole one is probably closer to the mark in inferring that they tended either to support Achaemenid rule or to swing back toward it if conditions were temporarily upset.

Conclusion

As a modern observer looks back on Persian policy in the light of Alexander's invasion, he might conclude that the empire was ill-judged in limiting its aims as severely as it did. The Persian kings of the fourth century were content to be naval masters of the Aegean and to be arbiters of Greek affairs, but they played on the bitter divisions of the *poleis* only to serve these objectives; never was there any effort to proceed further toward asserting direct mastery. Perhaps the Persians too drew lessons from history, and concluded from the failures of Darius and Xerxes that the Greeks were at once too likely to unite again if attacked directly and also sufficiently weak if kept apart by cunning promises and bribes ¹⁰⁰).

Herodotus was unconsciously a better prophet when he had Xerxes assert:

Retreat is no longer possible for either of us: if we do not inflict the wound, we shall assuredly receive it. All we possess will pass to the Greeks, or all they possess will pass to us. That is the choice before for us; in the enmity between us there is no middle course ¹⁰¹).

But neither the Father of History nor the Persian government could have foreseen Alexander; across the fourth century down to his coming the Greek cities and native dynasts of Asia Minor alike accepted Persian over-all direction of political life. As we turn to consider parallel economic and social developments and then the cultural relations between Greeks and Persians Achaemenid political power

¹⁰⁰) Polyaeus 7.16.2 asserts that division of the Greeks was a deliberate policy by Artaxerxes II; cf. Demosthenes, *On the Navy Boards* 3-5 (an excellent analysis of the splintering of the Greeks); Xenophon, *Hellenica* 4.8.2 (advice of Conon).

¹⁰¹) Herodotus 7.11.3.

needs always to be kept in mind; Persian strength is not to be underestimated. Establishment of that fact, and a concomitant illumination of the fallacies in the conventional Greek (and modern) view of the Persians, has been my objective in this chapter.

II. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS IN ASIA MINOR

Political relationships between the Greek states and the Persian empire in the fourth century often involved the whole sweep of the eastern Mediterranean from Egypt around to Asia Minor. For economic and social development on the frontier between these two systems, on the other hand, we can restrict our view more specifically to Asia Minor.

From the Hittite period, or earlier, this vast area had been a land of varied social and economic patterns. By the time when Cyrus crushed Croesus of Lydia and went on to net the Greek cities of the coast differentiations were very pronounced between the seaboard and the bulk of the interior. Down to at least the fourth century the inland mountains and plains lie in the dark; then evidence appears for an interesting social evolution, and economic alteration can be detected both in the sheer quantity of activity and in the spread of more advanced economic structures. These developments were of far-reaching importance in themselves; the basic question before us is the degree to which they were due to outside influences, whether Hellenic or Achaemenid.

The Coast

The centers of conscious economic and social life in Asia Minor had long been the cities, equipped with markets, walls for security, temples and public structures. For the most part, though not entirely, these lay on or very close to the three seas which wash the peninsula, for their major commercial activity was necessarily seaborne. Around the cities, and over the interior, stretched great reaches of farming populations. These will concern us later, though it must be observed from the outset that rural and urban systems were not totally sundered ¹⁰²).

102) Bean, *Turkey beyond the Maeander*, pp. 242-43, cites an interesting example from

The important *poleis* down into Persian times were the product of a long protracted movement by the Greeks eastward across the Aegean. This expansion had begun early in the Dark Ages of Greece, before 700 B.C., though one cannot hope to reconstruct its chronology on the basis of the legends; at Miletus and probably elsewhere the Hellenic settlers occupied sites which had been developed in the Mycenaean era of the later second millennium B.C. What we can see is that by historic times, i.e., the seventh century and thereafter, almost all the Aegean coasts and islands had become Greek in speech and culture, a result both of population movements and of the absorptive powers of Hellenic culture ¹⁰³).

The consequences were varied and significant in every field of culture. To give only scattered examples, a small fortified urban center existed at Old Smyrna by the eighth century; the first temple of Hera at Samos was built in the same century ¹⁰⁴). Homer traditionally was born in Chios; Sappho and Alcaeus were natives of Lesbos; other lyric and elegiac poets lived in the coastal states of the mainland. From the seventh century onward large-scale sculpture was produced at many Greek cities, usually in softer styles than those of the Peloponnesus or Attica; East Greek pottery of the seventh and sixth centuries was also markedly different from the Protocorinthian and Corinthian ware which was dominant in much of Greece and the western colonies. The first "thinkers" in Western civilization brooded about the nature of man and the world at Miletus, and their ideas were spread to the other pole of Greek settlement, in southern Italy and Sicily, by such men as Pythagoras of Samos and Xenophanes of Colophon.

Alongside this cultural and artistic outburst there was major economic

Hierapolis during the Roman Empire, where a rich citizen built a stage in the theater "with the assistance of his own farm-hands."

¹⁰³) In my *Origins of Greek Civilization, 1100-650 B.C.* (New York, 1961), pp. 108-15, I have given a brief bibliography; Roebuck, *Ionian Trade and Colonization*, pp. 5-17, 24-31, surveyed the evidence up to his publication date. See also more recently G. L. Huxley, *The Early Ionians* (London, 1966).

¹⁰⁴) The excavations at the major center of Miletus are reported from time to time in *Istanbul Mitteilungen*; cf. the summary guide by G. Kleiner, *Die Ruinen von Milet* (Berlin, 1968).

development in the Greek *poleis* of Asia Minor. Coinage, we are told by Herodotus, began in the neighboring inland kingdom of Lydia, centered on Sardis; but the Greeks quickly adopted the practice of issuing standardized lumps of silver marked by a city device to attest its reliability ¹⁰⁵). Ionian states traded and founded settlements in the western Mediterranean, they also had a prominent place in the trading factory of Naucratis on the Egyptian coast and provided mercenaries for the pharaohs, and Miletus established a huge network of trading posts and colonies in the Black Sea to tap its output of metals, fish, slaves, and wheat. This activity, it will be noted, was almost entirely directed outward by sea, though East Greek pottery did make its way inland to Gordium in Phrygia and to Sardis in Lydia; the rural territories of most Greek cities along the western coast of Asia Minor were not large, and do not appear to have expanded significantly in historical times. Hinterland and coast, in brief, were then as little connected as has been true in most later Mediterranean periods.

The rivalries of the Greek states, and their general history, do not concern us directly insofar as they were expressed within the Hellenic framework of political life. The external independence of these states was ended by the Persian conquest of Asia Minor from 547 on, though they were allowed local autonomy. Often the Greek communities were under the control of native tyrants, but bitter internal divisions existed at cities like Miletus and helped to produce the unsuccessful Ionian revolt of 499-494. In any case the archaic and early Persian layers of the Greek centers lie so deeply hidden under Hellenistic, Roman, and Byzantine remains that it is very difficult to speak with certainty about the physical appearance of any sites in the Persian era apart from a few shrines.

Yet these cities were the centers from which Greek civilization could radiate among the native populations of the interior and there meet any

¹⁰⁵) C. M. Kraay and Max Hirmer, *Greek Coins* (London, 1966), pp. 353-54, gives the best discussion; cf. Kraay's essay, "Hoards, Small Change and the Origin of Coinage," *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, LXXXIV (1964), pp. 76-91. On the coinage of Side see Kraay, *Numismatic Chronicle*, 7. ser. IX (1969), pp. 15-20; and S. Atlan, *Kadmos*, VII (1968), pp. 67-74.

Iranian influences which might come from the east. So we must consider, at least tentatively, two major problems: first, the evidence for non-Hellenic elements in the cities themselves; and secondly their economic history across the Persian era.

It will quickly be apparent that the *poleis* of Asia Minor were not purely Greek. The inhabitants of Side, on the south coast, spoke and wrote a peculiar, non-Greek language down to the third century B.C.; Sardis was definitely a Lydian center; the other Persian satrapal capital, Dascylium, has been ascribed to a settlement of Greek mercenaries, but more generally is considered to have been an old native foundation¹⁰⁶). And, as is well known, even famous Hellenic centers had non-Greek customs. The women of Miletus, according to Herodotus, were originally Carian, and so they never sat at table with their husbands. The Artemis of Perge, to judge from the coins of the city, was a baetyl or sacred stone, a survival of the wide-spread Anatolian cult of Cybele. At Ephesus the high priest of Artemis was not only a eunuch but also bore the Iranian title of *megabyxos*¹⁰⁷).

Nor was commerce carried on exclusively by Greek participants, for there are tantalizing hints of a rather wider participation by men of non-Hellenic speech than has commonly been noted. In particular, the coinage which was struck and circulated in Asia Minor bears a great variety of countermarks. Sometimes these are symbols such as the Egyptian *ankh* or the three-legged *triskelis*. Often the countermarks are linear devices which seem more akin to Lydian or Aramaic letters than to the Greek alphabet; and these same designs are, intriguingly enough, to be found on the stamp seals of pyramidal shape which were carved in Lydia and elsewhere, mostly in the fifth century¹⁰⁸). Elsewhere the

106) A. J. Graham, *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, XCI (1971), p. 41.

107) Strabo 14.1.23 (C641) and Xenophon, *Anabasis* 5.3.6, as discussed by E. Benveniste, *Titres et noms propres en Iranien ancien* (Paris, 1966), pp. 108-13; he notes (p. 105) an Iranian name in a 4th-century Ephesian inscription. Cf. Roebuck, *Ionian Trade and Colonization*, pp. 33-34.

108) G. F. Hill gave a table of punchmarks on the *sigloi* in *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, XXXIX (1919), p. 126, and demolished the theory of Rapson and Newell that some marks were of Indian origins; the countermarks on coinage from southern

coin countermarks are definitely Aramaic or Phoenician letters; a unique example of a coin struck on the western coast by Tissaphernes in 411/10, though Greek in style, has an Aramaic countermark (Plate XIII.b). Apart from some of the pictorial countermarks especially on Cilician coinage these stamps appear to have been punched by private individuals, for their own reasons; and the designs do not suggest a Hellenic background in the main.

Another significant item is a bronze weight in the form of snarling lion with handle, found at Abydos and now in the British Museum. Although the shape is Assyrian, the weight reflects Achaemenid characteristics of the fifth century, and was inscribed in that century in Aramaic "correct according to the *stry* of silver". It may well have come from elsewhere in the western parts of the Persian empire, but its findspot gives further support to the possibility that even in Greek cities commercial activities could take place in non-Greek terms. This should not be surprising; men of Phoenician origin were active at Athens in the fourth century¹⁰⁹). In sum, it would be unsafe to assume that all the currents flowing through the markets of Ephesus, Miletus, and other centers were purely Greek in character. Thales, after all, apparently knew something of Egyptian cosmological ideas and of Babylonian astronomy; and a native of Asia Minor, the indefatigable Herodotus, had traveled widely into the Persian empire.

Our second problem, the strength of the "Greek" cities in the Persian period, has often been given a misleading answer. Most historians of

Asia Minor are listed by O. Mørholm, *Acta Archaeologica*, XXX (1959), p. 200, after Imhoof-Blumer. The parallel with the stamp seals is noted by J. Boardman, *Iran*, VIII (1970), p. 24.

¹⁰⁹) BM E32625, 31.808 kg; *Corpus inscriptionum semiticarum*, II.1, no. 108; T. C. Mitchell, "The Bronze Lion Weight from Abydos," *Iran*, XI (1973), pp. 173-75 (to whom I am indebted for an opportunity to discuss this important item). The Greek letter alpha appears to have been added at the base of the spine; the difficulties in taking *stry* as meaning "assayer" or the like are discussed by Mitchell.

On Athens cf. Xenophon, *Ways and Means* 2.3; Phoenician inscriptions from the time of Alexander have been found in the Piraeus (*Corpus inscriptionum semiticarum*, I, nos. 118-21). Dandamayev, *Historia*, Einzelschrift 18, pp. 49-52, gives a general view of trade in the Persian empire.

the past century pronounced a gloomy verdict on the Ionian states under the "harsher subjection" to the Persians, who were "weit unkultivierter als die Lyder"; in sum, the fall of Croesus was "ein ungeheures Ereignis für die gesamte Griechen Welt" ¹¹⁰). Not until Beloch, who always thought differently, does one find the firmly expressed judgment that nothing of significance was changed in Ionia by the Persian conquest; "economically as well as spiritually the land was never more flourishing than in the half-century after the fall of the Lydian kingdom" ¹¹¹). This view, however, has not swept the field; even so judicious a survey as Bengtson's can picture Persian rule as "much more oppressive and unpleasant" than that of Lydia, with deleterious effects on Ionian trade ¹¹²).

Students of Greek history have, on the whole, taken too seriously Herodotus' account of the refusal of Phocaeans, Teians, and others to endure Persian despotism and their temporary or permanent migration abroad. The Ionian revolt of 499-494 is often brought into play as a further example of Greek discontent, but the actual causes of this outbreak are a complicated matter not fully lit in Herodotus' pages. To a considerable extent the insurrection appears to have been directed against local tyrants and only secondarily against the Persian government as supporting these despots. After the Persians had reduced the revolt, they "destroyed" Miletus as an object lesson, but as was often the case in ancient history until the days of the efficient Romans the destruction proved not to be a complete elimination ¹¹³). The Persian authorities also gave over their previous custom of abetting tyrants

¹¹⁰) George Grote, *History of Greece*, c. 32; G. Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte* (2d ed., Gotha, 1895), II, p. 506; E. Curtius, *Griechische Geschichte* (4th ed.; Berlin, 1874), I, p. 564; and so others such as Bilabel.

¹¹¹) K. J. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*, I.1 (2d ed.; Berlin, 1912), p. 374; cf. G. B. Grundy, *The Great Persian War and Its Preliminaries* (London, 1901), pp. 1-5.

¹¹²) Bengtson, *Greeks and Persians*, pp. 7, 39; Hammond, *History of Greece to 322 B.C.*, pp. 177-78, is more balanced on the economic aspects but stresses the loss of political independence as a disturbing force in Ionia. Will, *Le monde grec et l'orient*, I, pp. 56-57, takes much the same position.

¹¹³) The Persian sack of Didyma at least, however, had been quite thorough; cf. L. H. Jeffery, *The Local Scripts of Archaic Greece* (Oxford, 1961), p. 343 no. 30 on a bronze weight carried to Susa.

to maintain local order and loyalty. Unlike Assyrian warlords the kings of Persia and their agents seem generally to have laid a loose yoke on their subjects as long as proper tribute was paid, and they were quite capable of altering specific policies to suit local pressures ¹¹⁴).

Beloch did not justify the view he held, though he might easily have cited Herodotus' observation that just before 499 "Miletus had reached the height of her power, and was the glory of Ionia." The physical picture to be drawn at the present time would in general support this view ¹¹⁵). As far as the limited evidence is concerned, indeed, the economic progress of the Greek cities of Asia Minor across the sixth and fifth centuries must be put in quite different terms than those which have been customary.

In a careful survey of the remains of architectural terracottas such as waterspouts and roof friezes from Asia Minor, thus, Åkerström found unmistakable proof that these testimonies to major buildings increased markedly in the second half of the sixth century ¹¹⁶). He also drew into account the evolution of the painted sarcophagi of Clazomenae as well as the building of great temples at Samos, Ephesus, and Didyma to support his conclusion that military and political events had no connection with the artistic activities of the cities. And these must, after all, be to a considerable degree a reflection of the economic prosperity of the centers in question ¹¹⁷).

114) Herodotus 6.42-43, a passage which if read carefully suggests Persian concern for internal stability and prosperity; Olmstead, *History of the Persian Empire*, p. 157, suggests the usual picture of repression. Compare the changes in Egyptian policy by Darius as sketched by Kienitz, *Die politische Geschichte Ägyptens vom 7. bis zum 4. Jahrhundert vor der Zeitwende*, pp. 60-66.

115) Herodotus 5.28; cf. his remarks in 6.21 on the grief felt by Miletus on the fall of Sybaris in 510, which suggests vigorous commercial connections between Ionia and Italy at that time. See especially Roebuck, *Ionian Trade and Colonization*, p. 136, and his earlier article in *Classical Philology*, XLVIII (1953), pp. 9-16.

116) Åke Åkerström, *Die Architektonischen Terrakotten Kleinasien* (Skrifter utgivna av Svenska Institutet i Athen 11, 1966), p. 244.

117) In a thoughtful essay, "Hard Times and Investment in culture," now reprinted in K. H. Dannenfeldt, ed., *The Renaissance: Medieval or Modern?* (Boston, 1959), pp. 50-63, R. S. Lopez presents arguments against equating great art with economic prosperity. This view has been debated; for ancient Greece we might

For the material which Åkerström has investigated the dividing point comes rather in the fifth century, when the production of architectural terracottas declined or really ended. Other evidence, which was marshalled some years ago by J. M. Cook, points in the same unexpected direction. As he noted at that time, only one small temple at Miletus could be dated to the fifth century; and the tribute lists of the Athenian empire gave surprisingly low assessments for cities such as Clazomenae which the Athenians had "liberated" from Persian rule ¹¹⁸). Cook sought to explain these assessments as reflecting the Athenian awareness that the cities had also to pay tribute to the Persians for their rural territories. This specific argument has generally been rejected; but in consequence we can hardly explain the nature of the Athenian assessments without assuming that the cities were poorer under Athenian rule than they had been as part of the Persian realm. In this connection it may be significant that Ionian cities undertook extensive fortifications only at the end of the fifth century and later ¹¹⁹).

The phenomenal rise of the Athenian port of the Piraeus after 450 led to a concentration of Aegean lines of trade at this point which may have reduced the commerce flowing through the harbors of Ionia ¹²⁰). It is also possible that lines of communication between the coast and

keep in mind the conclusion by A. French, *The Growth of the Athenian Economy* (London, 1964), p. 175, that the economic advance of fifth-century Athens was channeled into buildings rather than into improvement in standards of living for the average Athenian citizen. In the present connection the relevant point is not quality, but quantity, of physical remains; and any caution which one must voice relates primarily to the limited archaeological exploration of Asia Minor.

118) J. M. Cook, "The Problem of Classical Ionia," *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society*, 187 (1961), pp. 9-18; Russell Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford, 1972), pp. 269-71, prefers the explanation of Ionian poverty.

119) W. Kendrick Pritchett, *Ancient Greek Military Practices*. I (University of California Publications in Classical Studies 7, 1971), pp. 62-64, assembles the evidence on fortifications. His explanation, which seems more than doubtful, is a clean sweep of "most of the Persians from Asia Minor except for sparse settlements" as a result of Athenian raids; poverty is at least as reasonable a cause. The fortification of Lampsacus in 409 (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 1.2.15) and Phocaea in 407 (1.5.11) is specifically noted in connection with the turmoil in the late stages of the Peloponnesian war.

120) French, *Growth of the Athenian Economy*, pp. 107 ff.

the interior of Anatolia were politically hampered in the fifth century, but we still have very little knowledge as to the varying importance of the routes up the Maeander, Hermus, and other difficult avenues into the interior. Once again, unfortunately, the physical evidence from the cities themselves is inadequate to prove their deterioration, but it may be noted that when the Spartan naval commander Lysander came to Ephesus in 408 "he found it *poor* and in danger of being utterly barbarized since it was headquarters for the generals of the King"; not even the Panionian festival seems to have been celebrated in the fifth century ¹²¹). In sum, the Greeks of Asia Minor appear initially to have prospered under Persian rule but suffered a substantial decline during the period of Athenian hegemony in the Aegean.

For the fourth century, after the coast again came under Persian control, there can be no doubt that economic activity increased markedly ¹²²). The most impressive and widely based support for this view can be found in the coinage of the period. In this respect the silver issues, which have sometimes been found in huge hoards, must be taken secondarily, for they were often struck to support Persian military activities or for other public needs (e.g., Plate XV). What is really impressive is the growth in the number of mints and the widening range of copper coinage, which was used locally for commercial reasons ¹²³).

A wide survey of this material is afforded by the great collection

¹²¹) Plutarch, *Lysander* 3.2. On the road patterns see Roebuck, *Ionian Trade and Colonization*, pp. 17-18, 42-44 and the references he cites p. 17 n. 38; and for later times the detailed discussion by D. Magie, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor*, II (Princeton, 1950), pp. 786-802, who also comments on the temporary disappearance of the Panionian festival (p. 66).

¹²²) This prosperity was noted by Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*, III.1 (Berlin, 1923), pp. 301-02.

¹²³) On this subject we need more studies like that of J. M. Cook, "Coins from Aeolic Sites," *Annual of the British School at Athens*, LXIII (1968), pp. 33-40, extended in his survey of *The Troad*; G. Le Rider, *Monnaies crétoises du V^e siècle au 1^{er} siècle av. J. C.* (Paris, 1960), and L. Robert, *Études de numismatique grecque* (Paris, 1951), pp. 69-100, illustrate what could be achieved. One must, however, keep in mind the limitations suggested by Michael Crawford, "Money and Exchange in the Roman World," *Journal of Roman Studies*, LX (1970), pp. 40-48.


built up by von Aulock in the past generation, which is well published, but additional information comes from the major holdings of Copenhagen, the British Museum, and elsewhere. If we omit the islands such as Samos, Chios, and Lesbos, and also the dynasts and satraps proper, it can be calculated that some 31 mints were active in the fifth century and earlier, but that no less than 73 cities struck coins in the fourth century. Most of these centers lay, as before, on or close to the sea, but especially in northwestern Asia Minor purely inland communities began to strike in copper. These figures are only a suggestion of increase in coinage; for the volume of any one issue cannot be determined with any accuracy. The meaning of the types employed, also, will concern us again more specifically at a later point. Yet "even dubious statistics can point toward important questions that need solution, and sometimes suggest the directions in which answers may be sought" ¹²⁴).

The evidence which can be drawn from these large masses of little bits of silver and copper is corroborated by two very different lines of information. In the first place, the fourth century is the time when the Greek settlements on the north shore of the Black Sea began to blossom both agriculturally and commercially and coined widely; developments on both sides of the Black Sea were often interlinked (even in modern times the Turks lost the Crimea definitively only in 1783) ¹²⁵).

Secondly, the coastal districts of Asia Minor itself provide larger, more impressive physical remains from the fourth century than from the fifth. To cite only a few examples, the temple of Artemis at Ephesus

¹²⁴) Ralph Davis, *The Rise of the Atlantic Economies* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1973), p. xiii, a work which is very useful in describing a modern economic pattern of change.

¹²⁵) W. Blawatsky, in *Le Rayonnement des civilisations grecque et romaine sur les cultures périphériques* (Paris, 1965), pp. 393-403, puts this development in sharp focus; on the detailed explorations in the Crimea see the summary by Jan Pečírka in *Eirene*, VIII (1970), pp. 123-74. L. Zgusta, *Die Personennamen griechischer Städte der nördlichen Schwarzmeerküste* (Československá Akademie Věd, monografie orientálního ústavu, 16, Prague, 1955), pp. 326-31, discusses names from Asia Minor and rejects the view of M. I. Rostovtzeff, *Iranians and Greeks in South Russia* (Oxford, 1922), pp. 10 ff., that ties between the two coasts were due to a Scythian invasion of Asia Minor rather than reflecting connections in the fourth and following centuries B.C.



was deliberately burned by a madman, traditionally on the day Alexander was born in 356, but was rebuilt on a huge scale; when Alexander came to the city in his invasion and offered to help defray the expenses, the Ephesians were self-confident enough to reject his offer ¹²⁶). Both Priene and Cnidus were relocated during the century, and the remains especially of Priene still form one of the major ancient landmarks of Ionia. The ruler of Caria, Mausolus, rebuilt Myndus and Syangela on new sites with greatly enlarged areas, fortified Latmus and Caunus with major walls, enhanced the sanctuary of Zeus Stratios at Labraynda, and improved his new capital of Halicarnassus, where his widow later erected the famous Mausoleum. Farther to the east the Lycians built a great number of magnificent tombs and other structures at Xanthus and elsewhere.

There is no need to belabor a very significant, but quite certain, point, i.e., that the cities of Asia Minor flourished in the fourth century; as far as can be seen, this outburst stands in marked contrast to the far less prosperous era of the preceding century. Although Keynes and others have taught us to look to state policies as an important factor in promoting or limiting economic growth, we cannot properly conclude that the prosperity of the fourth century was directly due to Persian incitement. On the other hand it would seem evident that Persian rule did not seriously impede the great progress which is evident in the coinage and physical remains of the era. Internal stability and the evolution of trading activity had produced a situation in which marked advance could occur; one small but interesting example is provided by the consolidation of the state of Gergis in the Troad ¹²⁷). Here the cultural fruits were purely Hellenic; what happened elsewhere will concern us in Part II.

The Interior

Thus far our attention has been focussed on the urban centers of Asia Minor. These are the elements which appear in the historical

¹²⁶) Strabo 14.1.22 (C641); Priene, however, accepted his help (Dittenberger, *Sylloge inscriptionum graecarum* 117).

¹²⁷) Cook, *The Troad*, p. 351.

records; they also have left visible testimony of their existence. Yet these nuclei occupied only a minute part of the peninsula; for a rounded picture one must draw a parallel sketch of economic and social changes in the countryside during the Persian period.

To say anything meaningful, however, about the great bulk of population which lived in a rural setting is difficult for any part of the ancient world except in Egypt; farms and villages leave little trace unless ancient field divisions can be picked up in air surveys, as has been achieved in some parts of Syria, north Africa, and Italy. Rostovtzeff's statement in 1910 that we cannot form "a unified picture of the agricultural conditions of Asia Minor" remains true still today¹²⁸). for contemporary written information for life in the interior is very scanty. Traditional forms of early peasant agriculture might be much the same everywhere, and villages at outward glance would have been very similar; but a host of factors, including patterns of landholding, social customs, and other variables, certainly produced great differences in spirit of independence, confidence, and other important characteristics.

It is difficult even to define the sources and types of population in the Persian era, especially for the peasantry in general. Undoubtedly many elements were descended from the prehistoric and Bronze Age inhabitation, and we may assume that Phrygians and other invaders had merged with this earlier stock during the dark era following the late second-millennium collapse of the Hittite realm. In later Hellenistic and Roman times the linguistic map of Asia Minor was a complicated one; the evidence for our period, though scanty, is equally complex. Aramaic turns up on seals, coins, and inscriptions, partly because it was much used by the Persian administration, partly no doubt by reason

¹²⁸) M. Rostowzew, *Studien zur Geschichte des römischen Kolonates* (Leipzig, 1910), p. 240. My debt to his following discussion, which remains fundamental, will be obvious. Even today villages and rural towns in Greece, Turkey, and Iran will vary greatly, though they may be based on essentially the same technological framework. To describe these variations in antiquity, however, would be both impossible and also useless; the historical art rests on a cautious blend of specific illustration and generalized conclusion, a blend in which neither side can be dominant.

of the presence of Aramaic-speaking traders; but its remains cannot yet be called abundant ¹²⁹). Documents in Phrygian do exist, though not numerous. Testimony for Lydian, Lycian, and other languages spoken in southern Asia Minor is not much better, though improving; most of what survives is connected with royal or dynastic courts either as brief inscriptions or in the form of coin legends ¹³⁰). It is, however, significant to note that the volume of non-Greek writing seems to have been increasing in the fourth century as the upper classes became more advanced.

Throughout Anatolian history the farmers have lived in villages from which they go out daily to their fields; a modern survey speaks generally of the villages as "having remained in all parts of the country regardless of racial stock, political organization, vicissitudes of conquest, or degrees of culture" ¹³¹). In the Roman period there is testimony, as in Caria, to prove the primacy of the village there as the local unit of government; presumably the same situation existed in Persian times, even if our evidence is far weaker.

Yet generalization on this matter of rural living patterns should not be pushed too far. In the countryside of Teos and Miletus individual farms were each centered on a *pyrgos* or tower, which was undoubtedly constructed at the corner of a walled courtyard and dwelling space, as

129) A new survey of Aramaic in Asia Minor is much to be desired as it becomes clearer how important the language was in the Persian era. Beyond *Corpus inscriptionum semiticarum*, II.1, nos. 108-110, and various examples noted below, see the inscription found recently in Lycia (Cook, *Archaeological Reports for 1970-71*, pp. 54-55) and a prism with Greek, Aramaic, and Lycian text relating to the establishment of a new cult at Xanthus under the satrap Pixodarus (to be published in *Comptes-Rendus*, Académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres, 1974). For the stele of Dascylium see below.

130) R. S. Young, *American Journal of Archaeology*, LXII (1958), p. 153, and *Hesperia*, XXXVIII (1969), pp. 252-96; Otto Haas, "Die Phrygischen Sprachdenkmäler," *Balkansko Ezikoznanie* (Académie Bulgare des sciences linguistique-balkanique, X [Sofia], 1966); J. Friedrich, *Kleinasiatische Sprachdenkmäler* (Berlin, 1932); R. Gusmani, *Lydisches Wörterbuch* (Heidelberg, 1964); A. Heubeck on Lydian and G. Neumann on Lycian in *Handbuch der Orientalistik* I. Abteilung, Vol. II. 2 (Leiden, 1969).

131) Jones, *Cities of the Eastern Roman Provinces*, p. 31; T. R. S. Broughton, *Economic Survey of Ancient Rome*, IV (Baltimore, 1938), p. 628.

in better-known examples from Attica and the Crimea. Inland essentially the same type of structure under the name of *tetrapyrgia* appears at Phrygian Celaenae in the days of Alexander's marshal Eumenes ¹³²). Thus far, however, no rural villas have been found for the Persian period, like those which are known for many areas in the Roman Empire; even for the satraps of Sardis and Dascylium we can say only that they did have palaces and "paradises" or hunting parks ¹³³).

In the Greek cities the rural citizens may not have paid any direct land taxes; for the inland agricultural population, on the other hand, there can be no doubt that they were so obligated ¹³⁴). In this as in other respects the economic structure of the interior was fundamentally Near Eastern. The pseudo-Aristotelian *Oeconomica* identified the "satrapal economy," as distinguished from royal, city, and private, as one in which revenues were drawn especially from the land in the form of a tithe, secondly from rural private property in the shape of gold, silver, copper, and other items, thirdly from market dues, and then from other levies and head taxes ¹³⁵). A letter from Alexander to Priene thus spoke of the *phoros* of the villagers living on the royal domains ¹³⁶).

¹³²) Plutarch, *Eumenes* 8; Rostovtzeff, *Kolonat*, pp. 253-55. More recent physical evidence is summarized by Jan Pečírka, "Homestead Farms in Classical and Hellenistic Hellas," *Problèmes de la terre en Grèce*, ed. M. I. Finley (Paris, 1973), pp. 133-47, with references to his earlier studies; D. W. S. Hunt, "Feudal Survivals in Ionia," *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, LXVII (1947), pp. 68-76; M. Rostovtzeff, *The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World*, I (Oxford, 1941), p. 508; Cook, *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society*, 187 (1961), p. 16, comments on the difficulty in recognizing rural estates. Later evidence on villages is assembled by Magie, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor*, II, pp. 1022-27.

¹³³) Sardis: Xenophon, *Oeconomicus* 4.20; Diodorus 14.80.2. Dascylium: Xenophon, *Hellenica* 4.1.15 (and others in 4.1.33). Celaenae: Xenophon, *Anabasis* 1.2.7-9.

¹³⁴) For the common view that *poleis* did not levy direct land taxes see recently M. I. Finley, *The Ancient Economy* (Berkeley, 1973), pp. 95-96; cf. John Hicks, *A Theory of Economic History* (Oxford, 1969), p. 22. But note the doubts recently expressed again by H. W. Pleket, *Vestigia*, XVII (1973), pp. 251-52.

¹³⁵) [Aristotle], *Oeconomica* 2.1, with the commentary by B. A. van Groningen, *Aristote : le second livre de l'Économique* (Leyden, 1933); Rostovtzeff, *Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World*, I, pp. 440-46; F. Altheim and R. Stiehl, *Die Aramäische Sprache unter den Achaimeniden*, 2. Lieferung (Frankfurt, 1960), pp. 137-49. As Will, *Le monde grec et l'orient*, p. 631, notes, the term "economy" here refers only to revenues and expenses, not to general economic analysis.

¹³⁶) Tod, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, II, no. 185.

In many parts of Asia Minor tribes were dominant, and remained so even close to major lines of communication down into Roman times ¹³⁷); we do not know in these cases exactly how rural taxes were levied and collected. The dues of many areas, however, were paid more directly to the agents and officials of the king (or other members of the Achaemenid family) or to beneficiaries of non-royal character. These may be called for the sake of simplicity rural landlords, both religious and secular; the modern tendency to label the masters as “barons” or the like and to describe their peasants as “serfs” may be inevitable, but at least for the upper levels can introduce dangerous distortions ¹³⁸).

Temple estates were significant in some districts, and can be traced on into Hellenistic times, when inscriptions and the geography of Strabo provide more detailed information ¹³⁹). Even a purely Greek temple such as that of Apollo at Magnesia could be described, purportedly in the time of Darius, as holding sway over peasants ¹⁴⁰); and the chief priest of Artemis at Ephesus bore, as noted above, a title somehow derived from an Iranian proper name.

¹³⁷) See, for example, Jones, *Cities of the Eastern Roman Provinces*, pp. 38, 92.

¹³⁸) Jones thus speaks of serfs; but observe the very limited evidence even from Hellenistic times which he cites (p. 384, n. 20); a similar scarcity of detailed evidence for anything which might be called “baron” appears in Magie, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor*, II, p. 1070, n. 10, 1096, n. 6.

¹³⁹) Rostovtzeff, *Kolonat*, pp. 269-78, gives the relevant material, especially Strabo 11.8.4 (C512), 12.2.3 (535), 12.2.5 (537). See more recently T. R. S. Broughton, “New Evidence on Temple-Estates in Asia Minor,” *Studies in Honor of Allan Chester Johnson* (Princeton, 1951), pp. 236-50; T. Zawadski, “Quelques remarques sur l’étendue et l’accroissement des domaines des grands temples en Asia Mineure,” *Eos*, XLVI (1952/3), pp. 83-96, and his Polish study on Hellenistic conditions (Historical Commission of the Poznan Society of Friends of Science, XVI.3 [1952]); Finley, *The Ancient Economy*, p. 190 n. 17. But note the caution of Jones, *Cities of the Eastern Roman Provinces*, p. 39, on the role of temples.

¹⁴⁰) Tod, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, I, no. 10. Doubts have been voiced about the genuineness of this purported Greek version of a letter from Darius to the satrap Gadatas, as by Beloch (and E. Badian, in a seminar discussion at Harvard University); but cf. the thorough analysis of its terminology by F. Lochner-Hüttenbach in W. Brandenstein and M. Mayrhofer, *Handbuch des Altpersischen* (Wiesbaden, 1964), pp. 91-98. The important point here is its assumption that a Greek temple could hold peasants.

Most of the major temple estates, however, such as that of Ma at Comana were centered on the worship of native Anatolian deities; and that syncretism with Iranian cults which appears at various points in the Hellenistic period cannot be discussed with any certainty for the era of Achaemenid rule. The one area where information of purely Achaemenid date can be found is Cilicia; the amazing blend of Iranian and non-Iranian cults here will be described in Chapter 4 in connection with the coinage of Tarsus. Just north of Cilicia, in Cappadocia, Hellenistic evidence shows strong Iranian penetration; and one may assume that influences from the east were strong already in earlier centuries ¹⁴¹).

For the secular landlords more specific statements can be supported, especially in the case of Pythius, the rich Lydian who entertained Xerxes. Pythius boasted of holding 2,000 talents of silver and almost 4 million darics in gold, plus slaves and estates; Plutarch preserves the information that he had discovered a mine on his property which he worked with his own peasants ¹⁴²). Beside locally sprung magnates of this type there were families of great Persians, such as those of Otanes in Cappadocia, Hydarnes in Armenia, and Tissaphernes in Phrygia, who controlled great tracts of the landscape ¹⁴³). It is quite possible that other, lesser

¹⁴¹) This Iranian syncretism is more often asserted than discussed even for later periods. The extensive series edited by M. J. Vermaseren, *Etudes préliminaires aux religions orientales dans l'Empire romain*, does not yet contain a volume specifically on the subject; H. Otten in *Religionsgeschichte des Alten Orients (Handbuch der Orientalistik I. Abteilung, Vol. VIII.1; Leiden, 1964)*, pp. 92-121, surveys the religious history of Asia Minor down to Persian times but in his last paragraph specifically omits Persian cults. S. Wikander, *Feuerpriester in Kleinasien und Iran* (Lund, 1946), is of some utility but is mostly concerned with later periods; see the references on Ma in *Der Kleine Pauly* III (1969), and the articles on Ma (Drexler) and Anaitis (Meyer) in W. H. Roscher, *Ausführliches Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie*. A tragic fragment of the fifth century (Athenaeus 14.636A-B = Nauck, Diogenes fr. 1) describes in some detail the music in the worship of Artemis of Tmolus (Anaitis) "in Persian fashion." An inscription recently found at Sardis (*Archaeology*, XXVIII [1975], p. 130) may help reinforce reserves on the degree of Iranian and Anatolian syncretism; worshippers of Varadates were enjoined from joining in the mysteries of Ma and other Anatolian deities.

¹⁴²) Herodotus 7.28; Plutarch, *Moralia* 262d-e.

¹⁴³) Dandamayev, *Historia*, Einzelschrift 18, p. 30; several references to the importance of tribute were cited in Chapter I above.

Achaemenid officials, soldiers, and private adventurers found Asia Minor more congenial than the thickly settled lands of Mesopotamia and Egypt and migrated permanently into the peninsula ¹⁴⁴).

Whatever their origins the rural magnates "who muster in the plain of Pactolus" shared a pattern of life which was far more akin to that of the Iranian nobility than to Greek ways; even in the countryside Greeks at this time hunted only on foot, not on horseback ¹⁴⁵). The nomenclature of Lycian and Carian dynasts, as stated especially on their coinage, seems purely local in the fifth century (Uvug . . . , Tāthivāibi, Kuprlli); but in the fourth century there appear in Lycia a Hellenic Pericles, whose heroon at Limyra is Greek in style, as well as an Iranian Mithrapata. Inland, however, no evidence of Hellenization appears in proper names; the foreign influences visible at Sardis, on seals, and elsewhere are purely Iranian. Names such as Artimas and Mitratas may reflect migration from the Persian homeland, but may equally as well represent native adaptations to the styles of political masters. This Iranian stamp lingered on widely even after Hellenistic monarchs had made Greek the dominant culture. In Hellenistic Cappadocia there is extensive evidence for Iranian names, as also in Pontus, and in the former district even Aramaic could still be used by high officials in the first century B.C.¹⁴⁶).

¹⁴⁴) A point which I owe in its formulation to Professor Richard Frye.

¹⁴⁵) On the annual muster of forces in Asia Minor cf. Xenophon, *Anabasis* 1.1.2 and *Oeconomicus* 4.5 ff. His essay *Cynegeticus* deals only with the Greek custom of hunting on foot; it is intriguing to note that in the 1930's an Englishman could have reserves about hunting wild pigs on horseback (Robert Byron, *The Road to Oxiana* [reprint; London, 1950], pp. 144-45). The Lycian dynasts are briefly discussed as rural magnates by J. Zahle, *Acta Archaeologica*, XLIII (1972), p. 112.

¹⁴⁶) See especially the investigations of L. Zgusta, *Kleinasiatische Personennamen* (Prague, 1964), and *Neue Beiträge zur kleinasiatischen Anthroponymie* (Dissertationes Orientales 24, Prague, 1970). In "Iranian Names in Lydian Inscriptions," *Charisteria Orientalia praecipue ad Persiam Pertinentia* (Prague, 1957), pp. 397-400, he advances evidence that Lydians had taken on Iranian names; see also Benveniste, *Titres et noms propres en Iranien ancien*, pp. 101-106, and for Cappadocia the investigation by L. Robert, *Noms indigènes dans l'Asie-Mineure gréco-romaine* (Paris, 1963), pp. 514 ff. On third-century coinage from this latter area native rulers still appeared in Persian garb, though with Greek inscriptions (K. Regling, *Zeitschrift für Numismatik*, XLII [1932], pp. 1 ff.); M. Lidzbarski, *Ephemeris für semitische Epigraphik*, I (1900/2), pp. 59-74.

Economically and culturally the inland villages were almost hermetically sealed, for the revenues of rural magnates of any type, insofar as they were agricultural produce, must have been consumed on the spot. The transport of food by land from central Anatolia to the coast would not have been feasible; for another part of the ancient world it has been calculated that purely rural markets could scarcely reach out more than four or five miles from the centers ¹⁴⁷). Inland cities—apart from such places as Sardis and Gordium—scarcely existed in the Persian era; until modern modes of transportation were introduced into central Anatolia city life always remained very secondary ¹⁴⁸).

Nonetheless this isolation did begin to decrease by the fourth century, especially in the western districts and along major lines of communication. The landlords in these areas became more acquainted with and desirous of luxuries and artistic products, which survive in their painted and sculptured tombs, in inscriptions, and in gems and seals commissioned for their use. This type of evidence reaches a high point in the lands of the Lycian and Carian dynasts, close to the southwestern coast, who were an evolved, more conscious form of the rural magnates, sometimes dominating even cities; but it appears elsewhere in the inland belt beyond the coasts. These artistic remains will be more fully described in Chapter 4, at which point we can assess their illumination of the Iranian patterns of rural life; here three important points may be briefly listed. In the first place, this varied body of material demonstrates a growing acquaintance with both Hellenic and Iranian artistic styles. Secondly, it may suggest that socially the noble ways of

published a relief of Ahura Mazda and others with Aramaic which he dated to the second century B.C. But see F. Rosenthal, *Die aramaistische Forschung seit Th. Nöldeke's Veröffentlichungen* (Leiden, 1939), p. 29, as cited by Bivar, *W. B. Henning Memorial Volume*, p. 50.

147) Finley, *The Ancient Economy*, p. 127; cf. his remarks on p. 107 on the typical peasant market. Specialty items such as red ocher, however, could stand the expenses of transport to the coast especially via Sinope (Magie, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor*, II, pp. 1076-77).

148) M. Hammond, *The City in the Ancient World* (Cambridge, Mass., 1972), pp. 93-105. The *New York Times*, May 1, 1955, states that trucking in Anatolia now is one-tenth as expensive and twenty-five times as fast as ox-cart and burro-back transportation.

life were becoming more conscious and refined, though mainly along Iranian lines. Thirdly, artistic products had obviously to be paid for in some way useful to their creators.

In close connection with this third aspect may be placed interesting developments in the field of coinage. On the interior plateau Ariarathes I of Cappadocia was the first local monarch to strike his own currency (apart from Lydia); he seems to have begun by imitating the coinage of Sinope shortly before Alexander's invasion and thereafter the issues of Tarsus ¹⁴⁹). After taking control of Asia Minor, however, the Persian government itself had continued the Lydian policy of striking silver coinage, presumably at Sardis. Throughout the sixth century the Persians used the lion/bull type of Croesus, but on a lighter standard; thereafter they issued *sigloi* with types of the Persian king with bow and spear, similar to those employed on the gold darics (the mint of which is not yet known). These silver lumps vary so little in design that they cannot be arranged in any chronological scheme (Plate XIII.d). To judge from hoards the *sigloi* circulated primarily in western Asia Minor, but did make their way as far as Afghanistan; none have thus far been found in Egypt ¹⁵⁰).

The use of coinage, both Persian and Greek, in inland Asia Minor is to some degree illuminated by the evidence of hoards. Deposits from the fifth century and earlier are mostly connected very closely to the western coast or to Sardis. At Pirli bey, well inland on the Maeander route, over one thousand darics were discovered long ago ¹⁵¹); *sigloi*

149) E. T. Newell, *The Küchük Köhne Hoard* (Numismatic Notes and Monographs 46, New York, 1931), pp. 13-22.

150) D. Schlumberger, "L'argent grec dans l'empire achéménide," *Mémoires de la délégation française en Afghanistan*, XIV (Paris, 1953), who lists *sigloi* hoards on pp. 6-7, 54-56, cf. p. 15. See also P. Naster, "Remarques . . . au sujet des Créséides," *Congrès international de numismatique*, 1961, II, pp. 25-34; and Kraay-Hirmer, p. 358. A few *sigloi* have turned up in Iran; cf. *Inventory of Greek Coin Hoards*, ed. M. Thompson, O. Mørholm, C. M. Kraay (New York, 1973), nos. 1790-91; but none were found by Schmidt at Persepolis. The pre-Alexandrian coinage discovered there came mainly from Sinope, Aspendus, Cyprus, and scattered western Asia Minor mints (*Persepolis*, II, pp. 110-14); much the same picture was evident in the material available in the Tehran antiquities market in 1974.

151) *Inventory*, no. 1222; cf. nos. 1178, 1194, 1197, 1201, 1216, 1224, 1225, 1230, 1233.

appear in a number of hoards. From the fourth century some extremely large hoards of Cilician and other issues have been found in areas bordering the southern coast; some of these contain also coins of Cyprus and Phoenicia, illustrating the connections between these areas and the south coast of Asia Minor which are evident in the political history of the period¹⁵²).

Within the mountainous borders of the central plateau no fifth-century hoards have thus far been uncovered, but significant evidence appears in the fourth century at several points. At Karaman, beyond the southern coastal mountains, a large hoard mainly of Cilician issues but with a number of Sinope drachmas was found in 1947/1948. Farther west, at Elmali, a hoard of Lycian and south coast issues was buried about 375-370¹⁵³). Other finds lie close to an inland route from Tarsus in Cilicia on the south through Cappadocia to Black Sea ports such as Sinope. One of these, found in the last century at Caesarea in Cappadocia, had coins of Aspendus, Selge, and Tarsus (issued by Datames and Mazaeus)¹⁵⁴); another interesting group, found to the north at Küçük Köhne (fifty-odd miles southwest of Ariarathes' capital of Gaziura), mingled the northern coins of Amisus and Sinope with Tarsus issues of Mazaeus and the early Alexandrian period¹⁵⁵). Other hoards of the era have appeared in Lycaonia, Phrygia, and Pisidia¹⁵⁶); yet more will undoubtedly turn up to illustrate in greater detail the fact that by the fourth century coinage was moving from the north and south coasts into parts of central Anatolia and there was treasured by local individuals of wealth. The burial of hoards must to some extent be connected with unrest and sudden death, but the disparity between the lack of fifth-century material and its wider appearance

152) *Inventory*, nos. 1254-68.

153) *Inventory*, no. 1262 (Elmali), 1244 (Karaman); 1243 is doubtfully of Karaman, and other inland sites have been suggested.

154) *Inventory*, no. 1246.

155) *Inventory*, no. 1394.

156) *Inventory*, no. 1245 (Karapınar in Lycaonia, coins of Aspendus; cf. no. 1248); 1247 (Gordium in Phrygia, *sigloi*); 1248 (Kütahya in Phrygia, Cyzicus and Ephesus issues); 1249 (Isparta in Pisidia, *sigloi*).

in the fourth is so great that it cannot be explained purely in terms of fourth-century wars in Asia Minor.

This numismatic picture might be taken to suggest a growth in economic activity or at least its expression in money terms; long ago Aristotle was impressed by the utility of coinage in facilitating exchanges among farmers, doctors, and other specialized parts of an economic structure¹⁵⁷). But the historian must approach the modern concept of a "market economy" with considerable caution especially when he moves outside the world focussed on the Aegean.

On the fringes of the central plateau, the area where cities began to strike copper coinage especially, markets must certainly have begun to be active centers for interchanges in the Greek style; but inland Asia Minor had not necessarily reached this level. We know far too little about the progress and organization of trade in the interior, though it may be reasonable to suspect that temples and magnates dominated long-distance exchanges¹⁵⁸); and certainly we cannot postulate a growing demand either for export trade of bulk commodities or by emergent cities.

Yet there did exist local village interchanges, even if these were not linked into a full market structure; the *Oeconomica* identified market dues as a source of revenue—and also specified in its description of a satrapal economy the payment of dues from rural property in terms of gold, silver, and copper. Moreover, two growing types of demand could have shaken the conventional patterns of rural self-sufficiency and tithe-paying. The Persian realm, that is, engaged in a number of military operations during the fourth century which either took place in Asia Minor or were based on its resources. Both the feeding of troops

157) Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 5.5.10 ff. (1133a.20 ff.).

158) Finley, *The Ancient Economy*, p. 28; Dandamayev, *Historia*, Einzelschrift 18, pp. 46-57, points out that in Babylonian sources precious metals circulated in bars etc. rather than as money proper, though coinage played a more important role on the Levantine seacoast: "Münzen verwendeten die Perser zur Hauptsache im Handelsverkehr mit den Griechen an den Grenzen des Reiches und zur Bezahlung der Söldner." Cf. also the negative response of P. Naster, "Were the Labourers of Persepolis Paid by Means of Coined Money?", *Ancient Society*, I (1970), pp. 129-34.

and animals on the march and the payment of salaries put pressures on the economic structure of the interior; throughout the ancient world wars were one of the most potent forces in jarring agricultural systems. The landlords, furthermore, were by this time displaying greater interest in specialized artistic products, the makers of which, as already noted, had somehow to be compensated.

Economic inerties, after all, do not necessarily arise solely through the expansion of trade; in the later Middle Ages, as has been observed, “money, in the form of taxes, and a market, in the form of bureaucrats and troops, transformed the production of isolated localities into a general economic system”¹⁵⁹). The growing presence of coinage in various parts of the Anatolian interior in the fourth century suggests that the area was undergoing a similar alteration, for similar reasons; dynamic factors had been introduced into a very static world—but as a result of political and social development rather than through wide-scale appearance of Greek traders.

Whether economic production, above all in the agricultural sphere, increased in the fourth century cannot be firmly determined, for we lack any quantitative measures of the population of Asia Minor or of any changes in its size¹⁶⁰). On this matter, however, it may be observed that factors of production are not to be assessed simply in Ricardian terms as set quantities of capital and labor; non-material economic factors, including management, technical knowledge, and above all an “economic spirit” which stirs activity, can have significant roles in encouraging or discouraging total output in any given situation¹⁶¹).

¹⁵⁹) E. W. Fox, *History in Geographic Perspective: The Other France* (New York, 1971), p. 51.

¹⁶⁰) In few periods of ancient history can we obey the dictum of J. D. Chambers, *Population, Economy, and Society in Pre-Industrial England* (Oxford, 1972), p. 9: “No general economic history is likely to be attempted today without reference to the demographic background within which economic change took place.”

¹⁶¹) J. F. Shepherd and G. M. Walton, *Shipping, Maritime Trade and the Economic Development of North America* (Cambridge, 1972), deliberately analyze increase in productivity in their period as derived primarily from improvements in economic organization, not technological or other material factors; this sensitivity is not always to be found in studies even on ancient economic development. See also the

At a guess, production did possibly rise to some degree; what is more important is the strong likelihood that economic *changes* were occurring in several inland districts.

These changes were not of the type to produce cities and urban markets, nor is it likely that they benefited the peasants proper. Royal officials, rural magnates, and temple priesthoods siphoned off as much as they could safely take, and by other than straight market means¹⁶²). An essentially Near Eastern economic structure, the “satrapal economy,” would appear to have remained almost totally dominant—but not quite. The important conclusion for our present line of investigation is that by the fourth century the social and political structure of various districts of Asia Minor inland from the coast could marshal agricultural surpluses—even if of tiny dimensions in any one village—and focussed these surpluses on building and artistic activity of many types as well as military operations.

Life, in sum, was quickening economically and socially; if coins could appear in interior districts, so too could ideas. To judge from the artistic evidence, next to be considered, as well as scanty suggestions in the religious field the ideas were as likely to come from the east as from the west into the interior; but for that matter we have already noted that the thriving cities of the coast themselves were not solely Hellenic at least in their economic elements.

first two chapters in Phyllis Deane and W. A. Cole, *British Economic Growth, 1688-1959* (2d ed.; Cambridge, 1967).

162) On this subject, which I hope to treat elsewhere, see generally Eric R. Wolf, *Peasants* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1966), or Robert Redfield, *Peasant Society and Culture* (Chicago, 1956). As Hammond, *City in the Ancient World*, p. 105, sums up inland Anatolia, “Society and economics were and are organized not around cities but around large estates subject to landed magnates, to temples and later to mosques, or to conquering warriors.”